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ABSTRACT 
Although one segment of the proactive cybersecurity debate—
e.g., hack back—has long been derided as a policy option carrying 
with it great risks of escalation, among other concerns, elements 
within the U.S. Congress and abroad are actively pushing to give 
companies a freer hand at defending themselves against cyber 
attackers.  This Article compares several of these efforts, focusing on 
the so-called Graves bill in the United States with the experiences of 
China, Singapore, Thailand, Australia, and the G7.  Given the 
Republican National Committee’s 2016 embrace of active defense 
principles, even as some firms like FireEye have begun to publicly 
admit to hacking back, the time has come to take a fresh look at the 
implications of this regulatory trend for both business integrity and 
international security. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the aftermath of the May 2017 WannaCry ransomware attack, 
which impacted more than 200,000 computers spread across 150 
nations,1 calls regarding the “sorry state” of cybersecurity became 
louder, leading some to resurrect a now old debate about permitting 
firms a freer hand in defending themselves from the onslaught of 
cyber attackers.2  On its face, such a policy might be sensical, echoing 
self-defense rationale and responding to the fact that many 
sophisticated companies are in the best position to know and 
understand their own defenses, and what they need to do “to protect 
their customers, networks, and valuable trade secrets.” 3   Such 
sentiments informed Georgia’s State Bill 315, which was passed in 
May 2018 and would have permitted “active defense measures that 
are designed to prevent or detect unauthorized computer access” 
until it was vetoed by former Governor Nathan Deal due to its 
“national security implications and other potential ramifications.”4  
Governor Deal’s veto statement, issued at the urging of tech firms,5 
serves to highlight that the problems involved in crafting such a 
policy are manifest, including attribution and escalation,6 although 
this has not stopped proponents from pushing the idea forward as 
 
 1 WannaCry ransom notice analysis suggests Chinese link, BBC (May 29, 2017), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-40085241 [https://perma.cc/68RG-
7Q46]. 
 2 See Josephine Wolff, When Companies Get Hacked, Should They Be Allowed to 
Hack Back?, ATLANTIC (July 14, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/07/hacking-back-active-
defense/533679/ [https://perma.cc/LVL4-NBDH]. 
 3 Scott J. Shackelford, When it Comes to Cyber Security, Passive Defense is Best, 
UNDARK (Feb. 19, 2019), https://undark.org/2019/02/19/when-it-comes-to-cyber-
security-passive-defense-is-best/ [https://perma.cc/M57J-BNXY]; see, e.g., 
Intangible Assets Increase to 84% of the S&P 500’s Value in 2015 Report, BUS. 
INTANGIBLES (Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.businessintangibles.com/single-
post/2015/03/11/Intangible-Assets-Increase-to-84-of-the-SP-500s-Value-in-2015-
Report [https://perma.cc/DTL7-AKP3]. 
 4 Tara Seals, Georgia Governor Vetoes Controversial Hack-Back Bill, THREATPOST 
(May 9, 2018), https://threatpost.com/georgia-governor-vetoes-controversial-
hack-back-bill/131822/ [https://perma.cc/L2HG-NU6Q]. 
 5 Zaid Shoorbajee, Google and Microsoft ask Georgia governor to veto ‘hack back’ 
bill, CYBERSCOOP (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.cyberscoop.com/georgia-sb-315-
hack-back-google-microsoft/ [https://perma.cc/4SBU-Q9GR]. 
 6  Veto Number 18 – SB315 (May 8, 2018), https://gov.georgia.gov/press-
releases/2018-05-08/deal-issues-2018-veto-statements [https://perma.cc/QG5B-
ULUX]. 
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part of the larger movement toward “proactive cybersecurity,” both 
in the United States and indeed around the world.7 
Proactive cybersecurity is an amorphous field, comprising a 
wide range of active and passive measures that are often commonly, 
though not always accurately, referred to as “active defense.”  While 
“hacking back” is a lightning rod within this field,8 it is just one data 
point in a larger and more dynamic movement, which includes 
technological, organizational, and legal best practices deep packet 
inspection to audits promoting defense-in-depth.9  Going hand-in-
hand with this amorphous understanding lies ambiguity with 
regards to the legality of active defense techniques such as 
“honeypots” and information sharing that are acknowledged by 
some governments as best practices.10  This Article, though, focuses 
 
 7 See Wolff, supra note 2. 
 8 See, e.g., Carl Franzen, Should US companies be allowed to hack China in revenge? 
New report says yes, THE VERGE (May 22, 2013), 
http://www.theverge.com/2013/5/22/4356196/report-tells-congress-
companies-should-hack-back [https://perma.cc/JX7X-FE7X]; see also Eric 
Chabrow, The Case Against Hack-Back, BANK INFO. SEC. (Jan. 6, 2015), 
http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/case-against-hack-back-a-7759 
[https://perma.cc/9WXW-U7TK]; Tom Field, To ‘Hack Back’ or Not?, BANK INFO. 
SEC. (Feb. 27, 2013), http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/to-hack-back-or-not-a-
5545 [https://perma.cc/7XUH-H8T9] (discussing, among other things, the 
likelihood of prosecution in the United States for engaging in hacking back). 
 9  See, e.g., Orla Cox, Proactive Cybersecurity—Taking Control Away from 
Attackers, SYMANTEC (Apr. 2, 2014), 
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/proactive-cybersecurity-taking-
control-away-attackers [https://perma.cc/3XM6-R369]; Michael A. Davis, 4 Steps 
For Proactive Cybersecurity, INFO. WK. (Jan. 18, 2013), 
http://www.informationweek.com/government/cybersecurity/4-steps-for-
proactive-cybersecurity/d/d-id/1108270 [https://perma.cc/8XYL-H3PN]; 
Hackback? Claptrap!—An Active Defense Continuum for the Private Sector, SEC. TODAY, 
https://sec.today/events/talk/3f45c4ca-98e7-4dcf-959c-86d73e51f8f5/ 
[https://perma.cc/7QTP-BGW5]  (“[A]ctive defense should be viewed as a diverse 
set of techniques along a spectrum of varying risk and legality.”). 
 10 See, e.g., EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR NETWORK & INFO. SEC., PROACTIVE 
DETECTION OF SECURITY INCIDENTS II: HONEYPOTS 17 (2012), 
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/cert/support/proactive-
detection/proactive-detection-of-security-incidents-II-honeypots 
[https://perma.cc/7PRY-RNSP] (defining a “honeypot” as a “computing resource, 
whose sole task is to be probed, attacked, compromised, used or accessed in any 
other unauthorized way”); Sean Lyngaas, NIST spells out information-sharing best 
practices, FCW (Oct. 30, 2014), http://fcw.com/articles/2014/10/30/nist-sharing-
best-practices.aspx [https://perma.cc/P9UL-CZ6L]. 
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on the active defense debate given its continued prevalence among 
policymakers in the United States and around the world.11 
Although “hack back” has long been derided as a policy option 
carrying with it great risks of escalation and enabling industrial 
espionage, among other concerns,12 policymakers at the federal and 
state levels in the United States, and abroad, are actively pushing to 
give companies a freer hand at defending themselves against cyber 
attackers.13  In fact, even as some commentators still call it the “worst 
cybersecurity policy idea,” 14  the policy has enjoyed remarkable 
staying power, even rising to the level of being included in the 2016 
Republican National Committee (RNC) Platform. 15   An entire 
industry is being created to help enable interested firms to engage 
in active defense measures,16  despite the fact that relatively few 
commentators—with the notable exception of former Homeland 
Security Assistant Secretary Stewart Baker—see much benefit in 
legalizing active defense measures. 17   Moreover, few seem 
convinced that the policy is even technically desirable given other 
established techniques for attributing cyberattacks back to their 
source.18  There seems to be more agreement, for example, on the 
need to reign in law enforcement’s use of the rather vague Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) given a spate of high-profile and 
 
 11 For more on the development of the entire proactive cybersecurity field, see 
Amanda N. Craig, Scott J. Shackelford & Janine Hiller, Proactive Cybersecurity: A 
Comparative Industry and Regulatory Analysis, 18 AM. BUS. L.J. 721, 722 (2015). 
 12  See, e.g., Josephine Wolff, Attack of the Hack Back, SLATE (Oct. 17, 2017), 
https://slate.com/technology/2017/10/hacking-back-the-worst-idea-in-
cybersecurity-rises-again.html [https://perma.cc/X7E3-ZYCF]. 
 13 See id.; Craig, Shackelford & Hiller, supra note 11. 
 14  See Wolff, supra note 12.  (“Active defense, for those not familiar with 
cybersecurity euphemisms, is the polite term for offense.  It’s meant to convey that 
you’re just protecting yourself, not attacking anyone, even though, of course, you 
are attacking someone—that’s what makes it so “active.”). 
 15 See Paul Szoldra, This one sentence in the GOP platform has cybersecurity experts 
freaking out, BUS. INSIDER (July 21, 2016) , http://www.businessinsider.com/gop-
platform-hacking-back-2016 
7?pundits_only=0&get_oall_comments=1&no_reply_filter=1 
[https://perma.cc/M8FE-G3GF]. 
 16 See, e.g., Fahmida Y. Rashid, Legal hack back lets you go after attackers in your 
network, CSO (Oct. 24, 2017), 
https://www.csoonline.com/article/3234661/hacking/legal-hack-back-lets-you-
go-after-attackers-in-your-network.html [https://perma.cc/J8F5-QMAE]. 
 17 See Wolff, supra note 12. 
 18 See, e.g., Joe Uchill, Rep: Hacking back bill not ‘the Wild West,’ THE HILL (May 
26, 2017), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/335294-rep-hacking-back-bill-
not-the-wild-west [https://perma.cc/U4T7-GTRF]. 
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controversial prosecutions in recent years.19  This Article compares 
several of these efforts, focusing on the Active Cyber Defense 
Certainty (ACDC) Act proposed in the United States with the 
experience of China, Singapore, Thailand, Australia, and the G7.  
Given the Republican National Committee’s embrace of active 
defense principles, even as some firms like FireEye have begun to 
publicly admit to hacking back, the time has come to take a fresh 
look at the implications of this regulatory trend for both business 
integrity and international security especially given that there is a 
paucity of literature on the topic to date.20 
The Article is structured as follows.  Part I unpacks the multi-
faceted cyber threat facing the private sector that has given birth to 
now renewed calls to permit active defense measures.  Part II 
analyzes the evolution of the active defense debate in the United 
States, paying particular attention to the ACDC Act including 
interviews with representations from Congress and the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce.  Part III compares U.S. effort at reforming 
active defense with Singapore’s proactive cybersecurity policy 
surrounding the protection of its critical infrastructure, which has 
now been underway since 2015, along with those of Australia and 
China.  Part IV investigates the policy implications of this research 
for managers and policymakers, including for the cyber risk 
 
 19 See Kim Zetter, The Most Controversial Hacking Cases of the Past Decade, WIRED 
(Oct. 26, 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/10/cfaa-computer-fraud-abuse-
act-most-controversial-computer-hacking-cases/ [https://perma.cc/HHN7-
CJTY]. 
 20 Cf. Jeff Kosseff, Defining Cybersecurity Law, 103 IOWA L. REV. 985, 1019, n.172 
(2018) (citing Paul Rosenzweig, International Law and Private Actor Active Cyber 
Defensive Measures, 50 STAN. J. INT’L L. 103, 104 (2014) (“In the United States, scholars 
have begun to debate the legality of hack back. To date, that examination has 
focused exclusively on domestic U.S. law. The discussion is inconclusive, though it 
is probably fair to say that the weight of analysis favors the conclusion that active 
hack back by private sector U.S. actors violates the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
(CFAA).” (footnote omitted))); Robert Chesney, Legislative Hackback: Notes: on 
the Active Cyber Defense Certainty Act Discussion Draft, LAWFARE (Mar. 7, 2017, 10:30 
AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/legislative-hackback-notes-active-cyber-
defense-certainty-act-discussion-draft [https://perma.cc/BAD2-
6MN2] (describing the discussion draft of the Active Cyber Defense Certainty Act, 
proposed by Representative Tom Graves, which would exempt “active cyber 
defense measures” from liability under the CFAA); Rebecca Crootof, International 
Cybertorts: Expanding State Accountability in Cyberspace, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 565, 581 
(2018); Sara Sun Beale & Peter Berris, Hacking the Internet of Things: Vulnerabilities, 
Dangers, and Legal Responses, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 161, 196 (2018). 
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insurance industry, along with the promise of targeted proactive 
cybersecurity measures to contribute to a polycentric cyber peace.21 
1. UNPACKING THE CYBER THREAT TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
A great deal has been written about the evolution of cyberattacks 
over the past thirty years since the Morris Worm was unleashed 
back on November 2, 1988.22  It is not the purpose of this section to 
rehash this work, but rather to briefly introduce the multi-faceted 
nature of the cyber threat facing the private sector, which is 
animating calls for active defense measures.23  In short, firms of all 
sizes face a growing list of antagonists online including hacktivists, 
criminal organizations, economic competitors, and even nation 
states; indeed, the threat environment is so complex and dynamic 
 
 21 See Henning Wegener, Cyber Peace, in THE QUEST FOR CYBER PEACE 77, 77 
(Hamadoun I. Touré & Permanent Monitoring Panel on Info. Sec. World Fed’n 
Scientists eds., 2011), http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-s/opb/gen/S-GEN-
WFS.01-1-2011-PDF-E.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XBH-HSMS].  For a more general 
background on the application of polycentric governance to addressing 
cybersecurity, see Scott J. Shackelford & Andraz Kastelic, Toward a State-Centric 
Cyber Peace?: Analyzing the Role of National Cybersecurity Strategies in Enhancing 
Global Cybersecurity, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 895 (2015); Amanda Craig, Scott 
J. Shackelford & Janine Hiller, Proactive Cybersecurity: A Comparative Industry and 
Regulatory Analysis, 18 AM. BUS. L.J. 721 (2015); Scott J. Shackelford, Timothy L. Fort 
& Jamie Prenkert, How Businesses Can Promote Cyber Peace, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 353 
(2014); Scott J. Shackelford et al., Using BITs to Protect Bytes: Promoting Cyber Peace 
by Safeguarding Trade Secrets through Bilateral Investment Treaties, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 1 
(2015). 
 22 To see the original findings from Cornell on this episode, see TED EISENBERG 
ET AL., THE COMPUTER WORM, (Feb. 6, 1989), 
http://simson.net/ref/1989/Cornell_Worm_Report_1989.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8VKE-35ST].  Some argue that the first cyber attack was in fact 
years earlier in 1982 when a gas pipeline in Siberia exploded allegedly as a result of 
Soviet spies who had stolen software from a Canadian company that had been 
implanted with a CIA-sponsored logic bomb, resulting in “the most monumental 
non-nuclear explosion and fire ever seen from space.”  THOMAS C. REED, AT THE 
ABYSS: AN INSIDER’S HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR 269 (2005). 
 23  See generally SCOTT J. SHACKELFORD, MANAGING CYBER ATTACKS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, BUSINESS, AND RELATIONS: IN SEARCH OF CYBER PEACE, ch. 1 & 
ch. 4 (2014) (discussing the rise in cyber threat including cybercrime and espionage, 
analyzing the development and history of cyber conflicts as well as the 
cybersecurity strategies of the cyber powers, arguing that cyber powers’ relying on 
an exclusively state-centric approach to cybersecurity may be problematic, and 
suggesting there is need for polycentric governance that includes private-sector 
engagement along with multilateral collaboration). 
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that there are growing calls to unleash artificial intelligence (AI) to 
manage it more effectively.24 
Hard, verifiable data is difficult to come by in the cybersecurity 
space given how reticent many firms are to share when they have 
been breached, and given that, until recently, many governments 
have not required firms to disclose the details of their breaches.25  
Estimates range greatly, for example, with regards to the overall 
number of cyber attacks targeting private firms and how much the 
average data breach is costing companies. 26   According to the 
Ponemon Institute, the average data breach cost U.S. companies $7 
million in 2017.27  But, depending on the scale of the cyber attack in 
question, costs can quickly skyrocket—the Equifax breach, for 
example, will reportedly wind up costing its insurers alone at least 
$125 million.28  On average, a recent report from the National Bureau 
of Economic Research (NBER) found that “[a]fter suffering a breach 
of customers’ personal data, the average attacked firm loses 1.1 
percent of its market value and experiences a 3.2 percentage point 
drop in its year-on-year sales growth rate.” 29   Not exactly eye-
 
 24 See, e.g., Alfred Ng, Stop Cyberattacks. Just Add Robots, CNET (Sept. 1, 2017, 
5:00 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/cyberattacks-artificial-intelligence-ai-
hackers-defcon-black-hat/ [https://perma.cc/6YHX-8M2H] (arguing that AI can 
help humans deal with cybersecurity more effectively). 
 25 See, e.g., SEC. EXCHANGE COMM’N, CF DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE: TOPIC NO. 2 
(Oct. 13, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-
topic2.htm [https://perma.cc/WJ4A-8PFH].  It is worth noting that the European 
Union will require such disclosures part of the new Network Information Security 
(NIS) Directive, see Peter J. Beshar, How Companies Should Prepare for Europe’s New 
Cybersecurity Rules, FORTUNE (Aug. 3, 2016), 
http://fortune.com/2016/08/03/cybersecurity-europe/ [https://perma.cc/58JY-
TZNT]. 
 26 See, e.g., April 2017 Cyber Attacks Statistics, HACKMAGEDDON (June 9, 2017), 
http://www.hackmageddon.com/2017/06/09/april-2017-cyber-attacks-
statistics/ [https://perma.cc/9J6E-57ZR]. 
 27  Data Breaches Cost US Businesses an Average of $7 Million—Here’s the 
Breakdown, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 27, 2017, 11:00 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/sc/data-breaches-cost-us-businesses-7-million-
2017-4 [https://perma.cc/AUE4-EUE9] (noting that these costs include 
remediation, customer attrition, business disruption, regulatory fines, legal and 
public relations costs, direct financial costs, notification costs, credit card reissues 
and identity theft repair/credit monitoring). 
 28 See Equifax Data Breach to Cost Insurers $125 Million: Property Claim Services, 
REUTERS (Oct. 2, 2017, 11:01 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-equifax-
breach-insurance/equifax-data-breach-to-cost-insurers-125-million-property-
claim-services-idUSKCN1C71Y8 [https://perma.cc/KSC5-BXAR]. 
 29 Shinichi Kamiya et al., What is the Impact of Successful Cyberattacks on Target 
Firms?,  (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res. Working Paper No. 24409, 2018), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w24409 [https://perma.cc/Z8HP-P3LA]. 
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watering figures; in fact, some firms, such as LinkedIn, saw their 
stock prices actually rise following significant cyber attacks.30  As a 
result of such misaligned incentives, proponents like Baker argue 
that the only way forward is to unleash the power of the private 
sector to better protect their networks, and vulnerable U.S. critical 
infrastructure given the fact that more than eighty-five percent of it 
is owned and operated by companies.31   The spectrum of active 
defense options is summarized in Figure 1. 
 
 
 30 See Nicole Perlroth, Lax Security at LinkedIn Is Laid Bare, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 
2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/11/technology/linkedin-breach-
exposes-light-security-even-at-data-companies.html [https://perma.cc/X7X6-
HR7J] (stating that LinkedIn’s stock rose four percent at the end of the week after 
the breach became public on Wednesday).  
 31  See Stewart Baker, Support for Retribution and Active Defense Increases, 
STEPTOE (May 22, 2013), http://www.steptoecyberblog.com/2013/05/22/support-
for-retribution-and-active-defense-increases/ [https://perma.cc/2SHZ-AVAQ] 
(arguing that private companies are being encouraged to do more than passively 
defend their networks); see also FEMA, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 2 (June 2011), 
https://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/programs/oppa/critical_infrastructure_pap
er.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5LT-9V4V] (stating that the private sector owns roughly 
eighty-five percent of the United States critical infrastructure and key resources).  
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Figure 1: Active Defense Spectrum32 
 
To consider how this idea plays out in practice, let us dive into 
the example of Shawn Carpenter, who in 2003 was a security analyst 
at Sandia National Laboratories tasked with investigating a cyber 
attack on Lockheed Martin. 33   Quickly, Carpenter and his team 
discovered evidence of Chinese state-sponsored hacking using 
‘rootkits’ to mask their intrusions. 34   Wishing to hold those 
responsible accountable, Carpenter suggested that the group should 
hack back at the servers responsible, but leadership at Sandia 
forbade the attempt since it was in violation of the CFAA, as is 
discussed in Part II.  Instead, Carpenter laid a trap for the attackers 
by generating honeypots, which are files used to fool hackers, full of 
faked intelligence documents.35  Sure enough, they took the bait, and 
Carpenter followed the hackers back to their source; in the end, “the 
rabbit hole went much deeper than I imagined.” 36   The myriad 
difficulties Carpenter faced still bedevil active defense proponents 
to this day, from encryption and attribution issues to spoofing IP 
 
 32  See WYATT HOFFMAN & ARIEL E. LEVITE, CAN ACTIVE MEASURES HELP 
STABILIZE CYBERSPACE? 9 (2017), 
https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Cyber_Defense_INT_final_full.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DEE5-YKGA].  
 33 See Nicholas Schmidle, The Digital Vigilantes Who Hack Back, NEW YORKER 
(Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/05/07/the-digital-
vigilantes-who-hack-back [https://perma.cc/8HAU-F6VU].  
 34  Id.; see also Symantec, Windows Rootkit Overview 4–6 (2010), 
http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/windows.rootkit.overview.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9TXZ-DMT6] (explaining that Microsoft rootkits refer to 
programs that use system hooking or modification to hide programs and behaviors 
and distinguishing between kernel mode and user mode rootkits).  
 35 See Schmidle, supra note 33. 
 36 Id. 
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addresses and the use of virtual private networks (VPNs).37  But he 
persisted, and eventually located gigabytes of stolen U.S. defense 
secrets on a server in South Korea, including plans for the F-22 
Raptor and the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter.38  Eventually, despite 
assurances from the FBI, Carpenter was fired for his efforts, though 
a jury in 2007 awarded him $4.7 million in damages.  This test of U.S. 
legal tolerance for active defense—defining where proactive 
cybersecurity ends and hacking back begins—helps set the stage for 
Part II, which unpacks the evolution of this legal concept, along with 
its current manifestation in the form of the ACDC Act. 
2. THE EVOLUTION OF ACTIVE DEFENSE IN THE UNITED STATES 
Despite longstanding interest in the field of proactive 
cybersecurity, the field has been relatively slow to develop.  For 
instance, early examples from the 2000s include efforts on the part 
of the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) to contain the 
problem of piracy by going after the pirates with distributed denial 
of service (“DDoS”) attacks, Trojan horses, and rootkits.39  Other 
examples include “Flash Mobs” targeting fake bank sites.40  In sum, 
however, such efforts were limited, fragmented, and relatively 
unsophisticated.  The reasons for this state of affairs are manifold, 
but include difficulties of attribution, 41  and the fact that 
cybersecurity was in those times an issue of far less salience and 
resulting concern to managers and boards of directors contributing 
 
 37 Id. ( “If hackers in Bucharest want to steal from a bank in Omaha, they might 
first penetrate a server in Kalamazoo, and from there one in Liverpool, and from 
there one in Perth, and so on, until their trail is thoroughly obscured.”). 
 38 Id. 
 39 See Robert Anderson, Brian Lum & Bhavjit Walha, Offense vs. Defense, 16 
(Dec. 11, 2005), 
http://courses.cs.washington.eu/courses/csep590/05au/whitepaper_turnin/Off
enseVsDefense.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4HN-6WTS].  
 40  Flash Mob History, ARTISTS AGAINST 419, 
http://wiki.aa419.org/index.php/Flash_Mob_History (last visited Sept. 17, 2014) 
[https://perma.cc/XT6R-Q79J].  
 41  Anderson, Lum & Walha, supra note 39, at 5 (stating that the biggest 
technical hurdle “is that it is difficult to pin-point the exact source of [an] attack 
since source addresses can easily be spoofed.”). 
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to a reactive status quo.42  But among the biggest barriers, in the 
United States but also around the world as we will see in Part III, are 
legal. 
2.1. U.S. Regulatory Context for Active Defense Measures 
Critics for some time have stated that the “biggest impediment 
to the deployment” of proactive cybersecurity measures have been 
legal.43  For years, a variety of stakeholders including scholars, IT 
practitioners, and the media have analyzed whether “Internet hack 
back” represents a form of pragmatic self-defense, or digital 
vigilantism—a debate that continues to this day.44  Dig deeper and 
questions proliferate, such as whether non-malicious third parties 
should be held liable for related damages.45  Similarly, the regulation 
of honeypots is also legally unclear. 46   But among the most 
important laws regulating this space at the federal level in the U.S. 
 
 42 For more on this topic, see Scott Dynes, Information Security Investment Case 
Study: The Manufacturing Sector, CENTER FOR DIGITAL STRATEGIES (2006), 
http://www.tuck.dartmouth.edu/cds-uploads/research-
projects/pdf/InfoSecManufacturing.pdf.  
 43 Anderson, Lum & Walha, supra note 39, at 5. 
 44 See, e.g., Vikas Jayawal, William Yurcik & David Doss, Internet Hack Back: 
Counter-Attacks as Self-Defense or Vigilantism, IEEE 2002 INT’L SYMP. ON TECH. & SOC’Y 
(2002), https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/1013841 [https://perma.cc/98XA-
C2AP] (discussing whether defensive counterattacks with offensive capabilities are 
appropriate for the civilian/commercial Internet context beyond information 
warfare); Phil Harris, Cyber Defense vs. Cyber Vigilante—Part 2—Hacking Back, 
SYMANTEC (July 16, 2013), https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/cyber-
defense-vs-cyber-vigilante-part-2-hacking-back [https://perma.cc/N847-Q2ZN] 
(addressing various considerations that may or may not justify hacking back).  See 
also Matt Reynolds, Self-defense in Cyberspace Would Put Businesses at Risk, Experts 
Say, MARKET WATCH (July 25, 2019), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/self-
defense-in-cyberspace-would-put-businesses-at-risk-experts-say-2019-07-
25?mod=hp_econ (“A House bill giving businesses the power to counter 
cyberattacks outside their own computer networks is fraught with risks to U.S. 
companies and critical infrastructure, and won’t stop criminals and nations from 
making attacks, experts warn.”). 
 45 See Kenneth Einar Himma, The Ethics of Tracing Hacker Attacks through the 
Machines of Innocent Persons, 2 INT’L J. INFO. ETHICS 1, 1 (2004), http://fiz1.fh-
potsdam.de/volltext/ijie/05256.pdf [https://perma.cc/3U3X-Z5D4].  
 46 See Jerome Radcliffe, CyberLaw101: A Primer on US Laws Related to Honeypot 
Deployments, SANS INST. 19 (2007), https://www.sans.org/reading-
room/whitepapers/legal/cyberlaw-101-primer-laws-related-honeypot-
deployments-1746 [https://perma.cc/7WBR-3WF8].  
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context is the 1986 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”), 
which we turn to next. 
2.1.1. CFAA 
The story of the CFAA begins, strangely enough, with a 
blockbuster movie.  In 1983, the movie War Games illustrated the 
potential of hackers to break into the nation’s nuclear arsenal.  
Reagan Administration officials took the threat seriously enough 
that they worked with Congress to pass the 1986 CFAA.47  Why is a 
1980s era law still so relevant more than thirty years later?  The 
CFAA, as amended in 2008, criminalizes knowing “unauthorized 
access” of a computer or “unauthorized transmission” of malware, 
along with “obtaining and trafficking private information, and 
affecting the use of a computer (such as by using a computer to form 
a botnet).”48  One interpretation of the CFAA is that it prohibits 
companies from accessing networks—even foreign ones due to the 
law’s extraterritorial reach.  Under this viewpoint, more passive 
measures involving the unauthorized access of networks likely do 
not violate the CFAA.49  But the global context is also worth keeping 
in mind as many nations now have similar laws to CFAA in force—
as we discuss in Part III below.50 
Interpretation of the CFAA as applied to hack-back campaigns 
is an area of active debate.  Historically, U.S. law enforcement has 
taken a dim view of such a “vigilante view,” there is an unofficial 
understanding that “[law enforcement] can’t handle the problem.  
It’s too big.  If you take care of things yourself, we will look in the 
 
 47 See Schmidle, supra note 33. 
 48 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008); see also Jennifer Granick, Amendments to Computer 
Crime Law Are a Dark Cloud with a Ray of Light, EFF (June 15, 2009), 
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/06/amendments-computer 
[https://perma.cc/YGR5-JZZQ] (defining a botnet as a network of computers 
working together to perform some task, such as, in the best case, a citizen science 
project). 
 49  See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RES. SERV., CYBERCRIME: AN OVERVIEW OF THE 
FEDERAL COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE STATUTE AND RELATED FEDERAL CRIMINAL 
LAWS, , 6–7 (2014); Ellen Messmer, Hitting Back at Cyberattackers: Experts discuss pros 
and cons, NETWORKWORLD (Nov. 1, 2012, 12:19 PM), 
https://www.networkworld.com/article/2161144/hitting-back-at-
cyberattackers--experts-discuss-pros-and-cons.html [https://perma.cc/K9GU-
QUL8].  
 50 Anderson, Lum & Walha, supra note 39, at 13–15.  
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other direction.  Just be careful”—because problems still arise when 
companies “get caught or when innocent bystanders are harmed.”51  
As an example of the confusion that has ensued, consider the case in 
2000 of Ehippies, which was then a U.K.-based online activist group, 
that struck at Conxion—a California-based hosting service—with a 
DoS attack.  Conxion could have stopped the incoming traffic in 
myriad ways, but they decided ultimately to “volley[] them back” at 
Ehippies’ server,52  actions that were later deemed legal.53 
The debate continues.  Baker has asserted that defenders, for 
example, who are taking back stolen data may not, in fact, violate 
the CFAA.54  Professor Orin Kerr disagrees, taking the view that the 
CFAA protects computer owners, not data owners. 55   However, 
although federal-level cybercrime laws with the CFAA being a case 
in point get most of the attention, it is important not to ignore state-
level efforts aimed at improving cybersecurity and regulating 
hacking back.  
2.1.2. State-Level Anti-Hacking Laws 
Due to inaction in Congress, states have been experimenting 
with a range of regulatory interventions designed to provide 
covered firms with greater certainty about the types of cybersecurity 
best practices, and active defense policies, permitted by law.  These 
include laws designed to prohibit unauthorized access, similar to the 
CFAA, along with data breach notification and anti-phishing laws, 
along with laws designed to decrease the incidents of phishing, DoS 
 
 51 Id. at 22. 
 52 Deborah Radcliff, Should You Strike Back?, COMPUTERWORLD (Nov. 13, 2000, 
12:00 AM), 
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/53869/_Should_You_Strike_Back_?p
ageNumber=2 [https://perma.cc/R3LG-2WR7].  
 53 Id. (“Chris Malinowski, the recently retired lieutenant commander of the 
New York Police Department’s Computer Crime Squad, says ‘returning mail to 
sender’ doesn’t constitute a crime.  But many information technology professionals 
say they wouldn’t risk taking such an action, even if they had explicit proof of the 
source of the attack.  The chief concern is accidentally slamming innocent sites 
through which hackers have routed their attacks to conceal their tracks.”). 
 54 Stewart Baker, Orin Kerr & Eugene Volokh, The Hackback Debate, STEPTOE 
CYBERBLOG (Nov. 2, 2012), http://www.steptoecyberblog.com/2012/11/02/the-
hackback-debate/ [https://perma.cc/R8JA-9YQ3]. 
 55 See id. 
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and DDoS attacks, and extortion.  The current state of these laws as 
of June 2018 is summarized in Table 1 and illustrated in Figure 2. 
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Table 1: Status of State-Level Cybercrime Laws Related to Active 
Defense56 
 
Type of State Law Coverage Description 
Hacking, 
Unauthorized 
Access, Computer 
Trespass, Viruses, 
Malware 
All 50 States All fifty states have 
enacted laws that 
generally prohibit 
actions that interfere 
with computers, 
systems, programs, or 
networks. 
Data Breach 
Notification Laws 
All 50 States  
Anti-Phishing 
Laws 
 
 
23 States: Alabama, 
Arkansas, Arizona, 
California, 
Connecticut, Florida, 
Georgia, Illinois, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Michigan, Minnesota, 
Montana, New 
Mexico, New York, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Rhode Island, 
Tennessee, Texas, 
Utah, Virginia, 
Washington, and 
Guam 
A total of twenty-three 
states and Guam have 
enacted laws targeting 
phishing schemes.  
Many other states have 
laws concerning 
deceptive practices or 
identity theft that may 
also apply to phishing 
crimes. 
 
Anti-Denial of 
Service/DDoS 
Laws 
25 States: Alabama, 
Arizona, Arkansas, 
California, 
 
 
 56  These data have been compiled from the National Conference of State 
Legislature (NCSL) Report on Computer Crime Statutes (June 14, 2018), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-
technology/computer-hacking-and-unauthorized-access-laws.aspx#Hacking 
[https://perma.cc/B5EU-DUV5].  It should also be noted that, in addition to these 
laws, twelve states maintain “data security laws,” eight of which include a 
requirement for firms to implement “reasonable” cybersecurity practices.  One 
example is Indiana. IND. CODE 24–4.9–3–3.5 (“A data base owner shall implement 
and maintain reasonable procedures, including taking any appropriate corrective 
action, to protect and safeguard from unlawful use or disclosure any personal 
information of Indiana residents collected or maintained by the data base owner.”).  
For more on this topic, see JEFF KOSSEFF, CYBERSECURITY LAW 42–43 (2017).  At least 
thirty-one states also boast data disposal laws that regulate when and how data is 
destroyed, including the use of “reasonable measures” to ensure that these data are 
“unreadable or undecipherable[.]”  Id. at 49. 
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Connecticut, 
Delaware, Florida, 
Georgia, Illinois, 
Indiana, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Missouri, 
Nevada, New 
Hampshire, North 
Carolina, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, 
Pennsylvania, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, 
Virginia, Washington, 
West Virginia, and 
Wyoming 
Anti-Spyware 
Laws 
 
 
20 States: Alaska, 
Arizona, Arkansas, 
California, Georgia, 
Hawaii, Illinois, 
Indiana, Iowa, 
Louisiana, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, 
New York, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, Texas, Utah, 
Virginia, Washington, 
Wyoming, Guam, 
and Puerto Rico 
There are twenty states 
and two U.S. territories 
have laws expressly 
prohibiting use of 
spyware.  Other state 
laws against deceptive 
practices, identity theft, 
or computer crimes in 
general may be 
applicable to crimes 
involving spyware. 
 
Anti-Ransomware 
Laws/Computer 
Extortion Laws 
5 States: California, 
Michigan, 
Connecticut, Texas, 
and Wyoming 
Currently four states 
have statutes that 
address ransomware, or 
computer extortion; 
however, other state 
laws prohibiting 
malware and computer 
trespass may be used to 
prosecute these crimes 
as well. 
 
As is evident from these data, states have been making progress 
in regulating cybersecurity even as Congress has been more 
hesitant.  This may be seen by the spread of data breach notification 
laws, which now cover all U.S. states, territories, and Washington, 
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D.C., despite the existence of a single federal standard. 57   Anti-
phishing, anti-Do, and anti-spyware laws seem to similarly be 
reaching a tipping point, with nearly half of U.S. states adopting 
versions of these prohibitions.  However, perhaps surprisingly, only 
a handful of states have laws tackling the ransomware epidemic 
sweeping the nation that has impacted everything from hospitals 
and police departments to municipalities.58  The balance of these 
laws is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 2: Prevalence of Select State-Level Cybersecurity Laws 
 
As for the substance of these statutes, there are various types of 
state anti-hacking laws, each of may target specific conduct and 
computer crimes.  However, these laws vary tremendously in form 
 
 57 See, e.g., Selena Larson, Senators Introduce Data Breach Disclosure Bill, CNN, 
(Dec. 1, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/12/01/technology/bill-data-breach-
laws/index.html [https://perma.cc/MZX8-WZG3].  However, with the enactment 
of the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), we may now be seeing a 
default 72-hour window take effect.  See Allison Davenport, CLTC Research: 
American Companies Struggle to Meet GDPR’s Data Breach Notification Rules, CTR. FOR 
LONG-TERM CYBERSECURITY (May 16, 2018), 
https://cltc.berkeley.edu/2018/05/16/cltc-research-american-companies-
struggle-meet-gdprs-data-breach-notification-rules/ [https://perma.cc/FT3S-
FSUY]. 
 58 See Alfred Ng, The Global Ransomware Epidemic is Just Getting Started, CNET 
(June 28, 2017), https://www.cnet.com/news/petya-goldeneye-wannacry-
ransomware-global-epidemic-just-started/[https://perma.cc/KZ3Z-DEU9]. 
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and substance.  For example, the state of California has imposed 
laws aimed at all the types of computer crimes listed above.  
California’s Comprehensive Computer Data Access & Fraud Act, 
which protects individuals, business, and government agencies 
from unauthorized access, interference, and damage to computer 
data and systems, has influenced other states to implement similar 
anti-hacking laws.59 
Because California is such a significant norm entrepreneur on 
state anti-hacking laws, 60  it follows that its jurisdiction is often 
stricter in the application of its computer crime statutes compared to 
a state with relatively few computer crime statutes, like Indiana.  
Indiana Code 35–43–2–3 Computer Trespass makes it a Class A 
misdemeanor for one to “knowingly” or “intentionally” access a 
computer, computer system or network without the owner’s 
consent.61  In Indiana a Class A misdemeanor is punishable up to 
one year in jail or a fine of up to $5,000.62   Indiana’s computer 
trespass statute is simpler compared to California’s Penal Code 
Section 502, which includes an extensive list of prohibited computer-
related conduct, several definitions of “knowingly,” and a variety of 
punishments that may be imposed.  While Indiana has only one 
general statute prohibiting computer trespass, California is one of 
the few states that has enacted different statutes specifically 
targeting the various types of computer crimes.  For instance, 
California is one of just five states to enact anti-ransomware laws, 
listed in Table 1.63 
 
 59 Johnathan Levine & Heather Haggarty, California Online Privacy Laws: The 
Battle for Personal Data, 25 J. ANTITRUST, UCL & PRIVACY SEC. ST. B. CAL. 69, 69 (2016); 
CAL. PENAL CODE §502. 
 60 See Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and 
Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887, 895–98 (1998) (discussing the potential for norm 
entrepreneurs to lead to a “norm cascade.”). 
 61 IND. CODE ANN. § 35–43–2–3 (2009). 
 62 However, Indiana is one of only eight states with a reasonable cybersecurity 
requirement to protect personally identifiable information (PII), as discussed in 
note 56. 
 63 Anti-ransomware laws are still in the early stages of development.  On 
September 27, 2016, Governor Jerry Brown signed Senate Bill 1137, which provided 
that the use of ransomware is now punishable as extortion.  Press Release, Sen. 
Robert Hertzberg, Gov. Brown Signs Legislation Punishing Ransomware, (Sept. 27, 
2016), http://sd18.senate.ca.gov/news/9272016-gov-brown-signs-legislation-
punishing-ransomware [https://perma.cc/4YB8-3ZAD].  California Penal Code 
Section 523(b)(1) states that “[e]very person who, with intent to extort property or 
other consideration from another, introduces ransomware into any computer, 
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Although most states are not on California’s level regarding 
cybersecurity regulation, the fact that all fifty states generally 
prohibit unauthorized access or interference with computer 
systems, programs, and networks represents a norm cascade of 
cybersecurity law that is quickly spreading in both scope and scale.  
Indeed, the EU’s 2018 General Data Protection Regulation was 
modeled, in part, on California’s efforts.64  With time, other states 
will be able to see the impact of laws enacted by leading influencers 
in computer crime statutes, like California, and be able to discern 
how to refine active defense measures within their own respective 
jurisdictions.  Yet this activity has not forestalled federal efforts at 
similar regulations, which could preempt the norm cascade 
currently unfolding across the nation, and indeed to an extent, the 
world.  The next section analyzes one of these efforts, including 
special coverage of how the effort is being viewed by core 
stakeholders such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 
2.2.  Analysis of Pending Active Defense Legislation 
As of June 2018, Congress was considering a range of 
cybersecurity legislation, from a privacy bill of rights,65 to election 
security, 66  but included in this list is the Active Cyber Defense 
Certainty (ACDC) Act, also often known as the Graves bill after 
 
computer system, or computer network is punishable pursuant to Section 520 in the 
same manner as if such property or other consideration were actually obtained by 
means of the ransomware.” CAL. PENAL CODE. § 523(b)(1). 
 64 See Laura Sydell, Do Not Sell My Personal Information: California Eyes Data 
Privacy Measure, NPR (May 28, 2018), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2018/05/28/614419275/do-
not-sell-my-personal-information-california-eyes-data-privacy-measure 
[https://perma.cc/GT54-LWH7]. 
 65 See Press Release, Sen. Ed Markey, As Facebook CEO Zuckerberg Testifies 
to Congress, Senators Markey and Blumenthal Introduce Privacy Bill of Rights 
(Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.markey.senate.gov/news/press-releases/as-
facebook-ceo-zuckerberg-testifies-to-congress-senators-markey-and-blumenthal-
introduce-privacy-bill-of-rights [https://perma.cc/CU3B-JDT3] (“Specifically, the 
CONSENT Act: Requires edge providers to obtain opt-in consent from users to use, 
share, or sell users’ personal information; Requires edge providers to develop 
reasonable data security practices; Requires edge providers to notify users about all 
collection, use, and sharing of users’ personal information; Requires edge providers 
to notify users in the event of a breach; Requirements are enforced by the FTC.”). 
 66 See Martin Matishak, Lawmakers gather behind election security bill—at last, 
POLITICO (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/03/22/election-
security-bill-congress-437472 [https://perma.cc/9ZCR-H9UT]. 
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Congressman Tom Graves, a Republican from Georgia, whom 
introduced it.  As of June 2018, the bill had nine co-sponsors from 
both political parties, and even though its imminent passage is 
unlikely at least in its current form, it received sufficient attention to 
analyze in some detail.67  Specifically, the ACDC Act would allow 
firms to conduct surveillance on entities “who are thought to have 
done hacking in the past or who, according to a tip or some other 
intelligence, are planning an attack.”68  The bill also clarifies “the 
type of tools and techniques that defenders can use that exceed the 
boundaries of their own computer network.”69  The bill, for example, 
would permit defendants the ability to claim “that their activities 
were “active cyber defense measures”70 so long as they could prove 
a “persistent unauthorized intrusion” directed at their computers.71  
In summary, according to Congressman Graves, “This is an effort to 
give the private sector the tools they need to defend themselves[.]”72 
Part of the impetus for the ACDC Act came from Congressman 
Graves position as chairman of the financial-services subcommittee 
of the House Appropriations Committee, in which capacity he was 
hearing complaints from bank executives who “bought the antivirus 
software and got all the patches [but] wanted to do more, and had 
the skills and the tools to do more, but didn’t know if they could.  
And some were taking extra steps but didn’t know if they should.”73  
One episode of note in particular involved Iranian attacks on the 
U.S. banking system, which prompted one bank CEO reportedly to 
declare at a White House meeting, “Ladies and gentlemen, we are at 
war!”74  In this instance, U.S. intelligence had known of the attacks 
in advance, and even know the NSA had warned the FBI in advance, 
which in turned reached out to the targeted banks, they still were 
not able to shield themselves completely from the onslaught, and 
were in fact investigated themselves in the aftermath.75  Perceptions 
regarding active defense have changed under the Trump 
Administration, as seen by former Secretary of Homeland Security 
Kirstjen Nielsen’s support for DHS “to work with the private sector 
 
 67 See Active Cyber Defense Certainty Act, H.R.4036, 115th Cong. (2017–2018). 
 68 Schmidle, supra note 33. 
 69 Wolff, supra note 12. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Schmidle, supra note 33. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
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to deploy active-defense tools against cyberintruders.” 76   White 
House support for active defense has only deepened since former 
Secretary Nielsen’s testimony, especially with the departure of some 
well-known skeptics, such as former cybersecurity advisor Rob 
Joyce.77  The U.S. DoD 2018 Cyber Strategy, for example, calls for a 
policy of “‘defending forward to intercept and halt cyber threats,’ 
including responding with (counter)offensive measures.”78  Indeed, 
this may be at least partly behind the Trump Administration’s 
decision to not sign up to the Paris Call for Trust and Security and 
Cyberspace, which included language against hacking back, as is 
discussed further below.79 
Concerns regarding the ACDC Act fall across several 
dimensions, summarized in Table 2.  For instance, former NSA 
Directors Admiral Michael S. Rogers and Keith Alexander, among 
others, have raised concerns about further destabilization in 
cyberspace.80  Others, such as Joyce, were more concerned about  
“unqualified actors bringing risk to themselves, their targets, and 
their governments.”81  Representatives from the Justice Department 
are similarly worried about private actors “[undermining] law-
enforcement investigations.”82   And then, of course, there is the 
specter of attribution that has long loomed large in active defense 
discussions in particular and cybersecurity generally.83  A former 
NSA Deputy Director named Richard Ledgett, for example, has 
 
 76 Id. 
 77 See Brian Barrett, The White House Loses its Cybersecurity Brain Trust, WIRED 
(Apr. 16, 2018, 06:56 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/rob-joyce-tom-bossert-
white-house-cybersecurity-policy/ [https://perma.cc/4QYE-QL69] (arguing that 
Rob Joyce’s, as well as Tom Bossert’s, departure leaves a critical vacancy in 
American cybersecurity leadership).  
 78  Jason Healey, Getting the Drop in Cyberspace, LAWFARE (Aug. 19, 2019), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/getting-drop-cyberspace 
[https://perma.cc/3VEB-G7L8]. 
 79 See Louise Matsakis, The US Sits Out an International Cybersecurity Agreement, 
WIRED (Nov. 12, 2018, 07:37 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/paris-call-
cybersecurity-united-states-microsoft/[https://perma.cc/Y3Y4-WNXE] (noting 
that a number of “major American technology corporations” have endorsed the 
agreement, even though the US itself has not). 
 80 See Schmidle, supra note 33 (referencing both Rogers’ and Alexander’s calls 
to act with caution to avoid escalation when combatting cybersecurity threats).  
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 See, e.g., SHACKELFORD, supra note 23, at ch. 6; Scott J. Shackelford, From 
Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber Attacks in International Law, 27 BERKELEY 
J. INT’L L. 192 (2009). 
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said: “Attribution is really hard.  Companies have come to me with 
what they thought was solid attribution, and they were wrong.”84  
Ultimately, though, at least from a national security perspective, it 
is unwarranted escalation that bothers many policymakers and 
analysts the most since it is so difficult for a private firm to know if 
they are up against a hacktivist group, criminal syndicate, foreign 
intelligence service, or a foreign state-owned enterprise.  Even 
Carpenter, whom successfully uncovered the Chinese espionage 
campaign discussed in Part I, has said: “There’s a lot of luck 
involved . . . Because you don’t know what other [intelligence or law 
enforcement] operations may be going on.”85 
 
Table 2: Advantages and Disadvantages of Active Defense86 
Advantages Disadvantages 
More advanced knowledge of 
potential threats and the 
attacker’s capabilities and 
intent, which helps to mitigate 
surprise and protect assets 
 
Backfiring due to human error 
or manipulation by the attacker 
 
Greater range of options to 
engage the attacker, including 
flexibility in where, when, and 
how 
 
Collateral damage as a result of 
disrupting or damaging an 
innocent third party computer 
or network or wrongly 
attributing the source of an 
attack 
 
Enhanced ability to disrupt or 
shut down a planned or 
ongoing operation even after 
the initial penetration of the 
defender’s network 
 
Escalation in an exchange 
between attacker and defender 
as a result of the attacker’s 
response to ACD measures 
 
Increased likelihood of 
deterring future attacks by 
complicating the attack, 
impeding the use of data, and 
Uncertain strategic implications, 
including the potential political 
and legal consequences of 
 
 84 Schmidle, supra note 33. 
 85 Id. 
 86 HOFFMAN & LEVITE, supra note 32, at 10.  
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raising the direct and indirect 
costs to and risk for the 
attacker (especially in being 
identified) 
 
measures affecting external 
networks 
 
 
Crafters of the ACDC Act are well-aware of these critiques 
summarized in Table 2, and consequently, built in safeguards.  For 
example, the bill “requires reporting to the FBI-led National Cyber 
Investigative Joint Task Force before taking active-defense 
measures, which will help federal law enforcement ensure 
defenders use these tools responsibly.”87   This would defuse, its 
proponents argue, any concerns with regards to escalation and 
attribution.88  But opinion remains split.  For instance, according to 
Matt Eggers, vice president of cybersecurity policy in the Cyber, 
Intelligence, and Security division at the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, “the Chamber is continuing to think through its 
approach to active cyber “D” legislation.”89  Eggers said later that: 
““Private entities should not be doing that [engaging in active 
defense].”90  Moreover, the bill would mark a substantial push back 
from the state-level trend discussed above whereby all fifty states 
have criminalized unauthorized access, and the latest attempt to 
chip away at these regimes—seen in Georgia, and discussed in the 
introduction—resulted in a veto.  The reintroduction of this bill in 
2019 has not altered the politics, despite the most recent version 
having bipartisan co-sponsors.91  That does not mean, though, that 
the debate has been put to rest, the least of which because other 
 
 87  Active Cyber Defense Certainty Act, Congressman Tom Graves, 
https://tomgraves.house.gov/uploadedfiles/acdc_expaliner.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3RRM-W74F] (last visited June 26, 2018). 
 88 Id. at 2 (“These safeguards help ensure that active defense is only targeted 
at the source of the attack, while imposing a strict standard of care on the defender 
to ensure that innocent bystanders aren’t impact.”)  
 89 Interview with Matthew J. Eggers, Vice President for Cybersecurity Policy 
in the Cyber, Intelligence, and Security Division, U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Nov. 
19, 2018). 
 90 Reynolds, supra note 44. 
 91 Id. (noting that under the 2019 version “Companies could monitor attacks 
using a ‘beacon,’ or software that a company could embed in its files so that when 
its data is stolen, it can trace where the attack is coming from.  Under the bill, 
businesses would inform law enforcement when they take an offensive measure.  
However, the law would bar the destruction of an attacker’s data, or remote access 
of the attacker’s computers.”). 
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jurisdictions are pushing the boundaries of active defense regardless 
of the official position taken by the federal government. 
3. GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACTIVE DEFENSE: CASE STUDIES ON 
CHINA, SINGAPORE, THAILAND, AUSTRALIA, AND THE G7 
This section globalizes the discussion of active defense with a 
view toward analyzing how other cyber powers are approaching 
this same policy debate. 92   The analysis is important for U.S. 
organizations as well since any hack-back measures they take may 
run afoul of foreign laws.  As such, while this part cannot do justice 
to the world of cybersecurity regulations pertaining to active 
defense, it does focus on efforts China, Singapore, Thailand, 
Australia, and the G7 in hopes of identifying areas of policy 
convergence and divergence between advanced democracies and 
fast emerging markets that may be informative to U.S. policymakers 
and managers. 
3.1. China 
China has long been proactive in both Internet governance and 
cybersecurity regulation guided as it is by the concept of 
“cyberspace sovereignty,” which has long been advanced by the 
Chinese government,93 and of which active defense strategy is an 
essential component.  This doctrine dates back to at least 2010 when 
the State Council of China declared its doctrine on cyber sovereignty 
 
 92 Lists of cyber powers vary greatly in their composition and methodology.  
See, e.g., JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., CYBER POWER 5–10 (2010), 
https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/cyber-
power.pdf [https://perma.cc/WW9B-Y972]; Shannon Vavra, The World’s Top Cyber 
Powers, AXIOS (Aug. 13, 2017), https://www.axios.com/the-worlds-top-cyber-
powers-1513304669-4fa53675-b7e6-4276-a2bf-4a84b4986fe9.html 
[https://perma.cc/Y564-FG39]. 
 93 See generally Scott J. Shackelford, Scott Russell & Andreas Kuehn, Unpacking 
the International Law on Cybersecurity Due Diligence: Lessons from the Public and Private 
Sectors, 17 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 30–34 (2016) (comparing different national approaches 
to cybersecurity, including China’s particularly centralized strategy); Scott J. 
Shackelford & Frank W. Alexander, China’s Cyber Sovereignty: Paper Tiger or Rising 
Dragon?, ASIA & THE PAC. POL’Y SOC’Y (Jan. 12, 2018), 
https://www.policyforum.net/chinas-cyber-
sovereignty/[https://perma.cc/HJ2Y-SBQQ] (discussing China’s philosophy that 
cybersecurity efforts belongs in the hands of the State). 
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in its “White Paper on the Internet in China,” which stated: “The 
Chinese government believes that the Internet is an important 
infrastructure facility for the nation.  Within Chinese territory, the 
Internet is under the jurisdiction of Chinese sovereignty.  The 
Internet sovereignty of China should be respected and protected.”94  
This paper also set out plans for enhancing cybersecurity and 
combating cybercrime.95  However, it was not until 2015 that cyber 
sovereignty was codified in China under the National Security Law, 
which evoked active defense “to strengthen network management, 
prevent, stop and punish cyberattacks, network intrusion, network 
theft, and dissemination of illegal and harmful information such as 
cybercrime.”96  
The reason for China’s promotion of active cyber defense 
measures was driven at least in part by its 2015 military strategy,97 
which aimed at winning “informationized local wars” and 
interpreted “China’s commitment to building a cyber force with the 
capability to engage in offensive asymmetric cyber operations . . . [it 
described] ‘active defense’ as adherence to the unity of strategic 
defense and operational and tactical offense; adherence to the 
principles of defense, self-defense and post-emptive strike; and 
adherence to the stance that ‘We will not attack unless we are 
attacked, but we will surely counterattack if attacked.’”98  As may be 
seen by this definition, the Chinese use of the “active defense” term 
falls more on the passive end of the proactive cybersecurity 
spectrum illustrated in Figure 1.  This lack of clarity, discussed 
further below, complicates international efforts aimed at 
establishing cybersecurity norms with regards to active defense, 
similar to foundational differences of opinion over multilateral 
 
 94  (国务院新闻办公室网站 ) [The Internet in China] (promulgated by 
Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, June 8, 
2010), http://www.scio.gov.cn/zxbd/nd/2010/Document/667385/667385_5.htm 
[https://perma.cc/4W4A-YTTT]. 
 95 Id. 
 96  (中华人民共和国国家安全法 ) [National Security Law of the People’s 
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 
1, 2015) STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ (China).  
 97 (中国的军事战略) [China’s Military Strategy] (promulgated by Information 
Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, May 26, 2015), 
http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/05/27/content_2814751
15610833.htm [https://perma.cc/4W4A-YTTT] (“China will expedite the 
development of a cyber force, and enhance its capabilities of cyberspace situation 
awareness, cyber defense . . . ensure national network and information security, 
and maintain national security and social stability.”). 
 98 Id. 
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versus multi-stakeholder forms of Internet governance,99  and the 
differences between “information security” and “cybersecurity.”100 
Chinese cyber sovereignty and active defense were further 
reinforced by two national policies in 2016.  The first was the 
National Cyberspace Security Strategy (“Strategy”) released on 
December 27, 2016, which set forth China’s positions and 
propositions on the development and security of cyberspace.  The 
Strategy states nine tasks for the national cybersecurity work at 
present and in the new future, including the need to safeguard cyber 
sovereignty, and to crack down on cyber terrorism and crime.101  The 
second was the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan for the National 
Information, published in December 2016 (“Plan”), which serves as 
an action plan of the Strategy.  The Plan states that “[c]yberspace is 
a new area of national sovereignty.  We should build cyberspace 
protection forces that are commensurate with China’s international 
status and compatible with our cyber power, vigorously develop 
cybersecurity defenses, locate and defend against cyber intrusions 
in time, and provide strong backing to safeguarding national 
cybersecurity.”102  As part of the implementation of the Strategy and 
Plan, China’s controversial Cyber Security Law, which came into 
force in 2017, was designed to improve cyber sovereignty through 
data localization and personal data protection.  Among other 
features, the law requires businesses operating critical information 
infrastructure to store all personal data collected in China within the 
 
 99 See Scott J. Shackelford et al., Back to the Future of Internet Governance?, 16 
GEO. J. INT’L AFF. 83, 83 (2015) (distinguishing national approaches to Internet 
governance, particularly China’s commitment to national sovereignty and 
“multilateral management” as opposed to the U.S.’s support for empowering “a 
global multi-stakeholder community” to exercise oversight). 
 100 See Neal Ungerleider, The Chinese Way of Hacking, FAST COMPANY (July 13, 
2011), https://www.fastcompany.com/1766812/chinese-way-hacking 
[https://perma.cc/62AM-XVS6] (transcribing an interview with Adam Segal, the 
Ira A. Lipman Senior Fellow for counterterrorism and national security issues at the 
Council on Foreign Relations, in which he discusses how the Chinese differentiate 
between information security and cybersecurity). 
 101 (国家网络空间安全战略) [National Cybersecurity Strategy] (promulgated 
by the Cyberspace Administration of China, Dec. 27, 2016), 
http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2016/1227/c1001-28980829.html 
[https://perma.cc/XKC4-44GJ].  
 102 (十三五”国家信息化规划) [Thirteenth Five-Year Plan], (promulgated by 
the Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Dec. 
27, 2016), http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-
12/27/content_5153411.htm [https://perma.cc/DYD9-AM48].  
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country.103  These strategies, plans, and laws provide the Chinese 
government with “a much freer hand to compel a variety of local 
and foreign firms to cooperate in law enforcement investigations 
and protect ‘critical information infrastructure.’”104  Overall, these 
policies solidify China’s march toward both cyber sovereignty—and 
its efforts to spread this notion globally 105 —and active defense, 
which will likely guide China’s activities in the cybersecurity to a 
more “managed” Internet in the years to come.106 
In summary, while the Chinese government has been interested 
in active defense for more than a decade, there is a lack of clarity and 
consensus on how the term is used and deployed as a matter of 
governmental policy when compared to the United States.  In fact, 
China has long outsourced its cybersecurity capabilities employing 
a diverse range of “patriotic hackers” targeting Western firms and 
intelligence services.107  A case in point is the 2018 Marriott hack, 
which resulted in the theft of over 500 million customer records at 
around the same time as the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) 
breach, making 2014 a time of “historic [cyber] assault” on U.S. 
organizations.108  In hindsight, such incidents help shine a light on 
the importance that the Obama Administration placed on securing 
 
 103 (中华人民共和国网络安全法) [Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic 
of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. Gaz., Nov. 7, 
2016, effective June 1, 2016) STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. (China). 
 104 Shackelford & Alexander, supra note 93. 
 105  See Evan Osnos, Making China Great Again, NEW YORKER (Jan. 8, 2018), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/01/08/making-china-great-again 
[https://perma.cc/8356-FGAM] (highlighting cyberspace as an area in which 
China’s global leadership is strengthening in the face of increasing American 
isolationism). 
 106 See Scott J. Shackelford, Welcome to the ‘Managed’ Internet: Unpacking Cyber-
Sovereignty in China’s New Cybersecurity Law, ASIA & THE PAC. POL’Y SOC. (June 15, 
2017), https://www.policyforum.net/welcome-managed-
internet/[https://perma.cc/Q9CT-X8MD] (explaining that China, along with a 
number of other countries, are increasingly agreeing on creating an increasingly 
State “managed” rather than global form of cybersecurity policy). 
 107  See Guest Blogger for Net Politics, When China’s White-Hat Hackers Go 
Patriotic, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Mar. 13, 2017), 
https://www.cfr.org/blog/when-chinas-white-hat-hackers-go-patriotic 
[https://perma.cc/7A3X-HZH5] (noting that China has demonstrated “implicit 
support” for young hackers’ attacking foreign targets, but also seeks to “restrain 
[the hackers] from undercutting Beijing’s overall cyber strategy”). 
 108 Lily Hay Newman, If China Hacked Marriott, 2014 Marked a Full-On Assault, 
WIRED (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/marriott-hack-china-2014-
opm-anthem/ [https://perma.cc/R55P-XACF]. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss2/3
2019] Rethinking Active Defense 405 
the 2015 U.S.-China Cybersecurity Code of Conduct. 109   The 
agreement may have helped mitigate the bilateral theft of 
intellectual property in the short term.  However, as these practices 
show no signs of abating and may even be getting worse in the face 
of ongoing trade tensions,110 other nations—including Singapore—
have begun to push the envelope on proactive cybersecurity. 
3.2. Singapore 
As with China, Singapore has been a leader in proactive 
cybersecurity in the Asia-Pacific for years in part due to its status as 
an epicenter for advanced technologies and finance. 111   In 2014, 
Singapore allowed private entities to take proactive cyber defense 
measures by amending its Computer Misuse and Cybersecurity Act.  
Specifically, it began permitting the government to issue certificates 
directing “specified persons” to prevent, detect, or counter specific 
threats to its critical infrastructure, including the financial 
industry.112  As of this writing, there has not yet been a public vetting 
of the performance of this initiative. 
To further its active defense efforts, in July 2017, the Cyber 
Security Agency of Singapore (CSA) released a draft cybersecurity 
bill for consultation. 113   The Cybersecurity Act was enacted on 
 
 109  See Ellen Nakashima & Paul Sonne, China hacked a Navy contractor and 
secured a trove of highly sensitive data on submarine warfare, WASH. POST (June 8, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/china-hacked-a-
navy-contractor-and-secured-a-trove-of-highly-sensitive-data-on-submarine-
warfare/2018/06/08/6cc396fa-68e6-11e8-bea7-
c8eb28bc52b1_story.html?utm_term=.c86896becdcc [https://perma.cc/52XM-
7W3R] (explaining that while China pledged in 2015 not to conduct commercial 
cyberespionage against the U.S., China does continue engage in some hacking 
activity against the U.S.). 
 110 Lily Hay Newman, China Escalates Hacks Against the US as Trade Tensions 
Rise, WIRED (June 22, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/china-hacks-against-
united-states/[https://perma.cc/BS58-VPK4]. 
 111 See, e.g., Cung Vu, Policy Report: Cyber Security in Singapore, S. RAJARATNAM 
SCH. INT’L STUD. (Dec. 2016), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-
content/uploads/2016/12/PR170217_Cybersecurity-in-Singapore.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/293U-VEQ7] (analyzing the role of technology in the Singapore 
economy as a driver of the country’s investment in cyber security initiatives). 
 112 Computer Misuse and Cybersecurity Act, Ch. 50A, pt. 3, § 15(A)(1) (2014) 
(Sing.). 
 113 Wai Ming Yap & Gina Ng, Singapore Parliament Introduces Cybersecurity Bill, 
LEXOLOGY (Feb. 14, 2018), 
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March 2, 2018.  It grants commissioners and investigating officers 
more powers and tools to investigate and prevent cyber threats, 
including potentially active defense measures.114  In the case of any 
serious and imminent threat to an essential critical infrastructure 
sector—namely finance, given its outsized role in Singapore’s 
economy115—in an emergency the Minister may direct or authorize 
individuals and organizations to take certain measures or to comply 
with requirements “as may be necessary to prevent, detect or 
counter any threat to a computer or computer system or any class of 
computers or systems or services.” 116   Those measures and 
requirements include, but are not limited to, “requiring or 
authorising the specified person to direct another person to provide 
any information that is necessary to identify, detect or counter any 
such threat,” “providing to the Minister or the Commissioner any 
information . . . obtained from any computer,” or specified person, 
and “providing to the Minister or the Commissioner a report of a 
breach or an attempted breach of cybersecurity.”117  The specified 
person would then be immune to civil or criminal liabilities if the 
actions were performed as required by the commissioners.  But if 
they do not comply, they will be subject to a fine or imprisonment 
as specified by the Act.118 
Singapore’s active defense initiatives highlight a development 
mirrored across other nations discussed below.  With regard to more 
aggressive active defense activities such as hack back, the primary 
concerns discussed above have centered on escalation and 
attribution. 119   By requiring State authorization, Singapore has 
 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=64cb1ae1-1306-465a-bfb0-
be0679671565 [https://perma.cc/ACD8-LRM4]. 
 114 Cybersecurity Act 2018, No. 9 of 2018 (2018) (Sing.). 
 115 See Gabriel Olano, Singapore’s insurance and finance sector growth to outpace 
national economy—MAS, INSURANCE BUS. MAG. (Dec. 14, 2017), 
https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/asia/news/breaking-
news/singapores-insurance-and-finance-sector-growth-to-outpace-national-
economy--mas-87663.aspx [https://perma.cc/PXT6-2XQX] (noting that in 2017, 
the finance industry was “expected to post a 3.7% growth rate, exceeding the 
national figure.”). 
 116 Cybersecurity Act 2018, No. 9 of 2018, pt. 4 § 23 (2018) (Sing.). 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119  See, e.g., MANDIANT, APT1: EXPOSING ONE OF CHINA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE 
UNITS 59 (2013), https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-
www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/FE8B-TGAN] 
(noting that “in a State that rigorously monitors Internet use, it is highly unlikely” 
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enjoyed some of the benefits of using private actors as primary 
responders to “emergency” cyber threats while taking some 
measures to maintain accountability.  This is similar to how the 
architects of the ACDC Act envision the role of the FBI in restraining 
and shaping U.S. firms’ active defense efforts. 
3.3. Thailand 
As with Singapore, cybersecurity has continued to be a 
preoccupation of the Thai government.  In 2018, there were 2,520 
incidents reported to Thailand’s Computer Emergency Response 
Team (CERT), including 1102 intrusion attempts and 335 successful 
intrusions. 120   Firms have become more concerned about their 
computer systems and data due to this onslaught.  Defense-in-
depth, including encryption and intrusion detection systems, is 
central to securing these companies and deterring cyber attacks.  
And the Computer-Related Crime Act, similar to CFAA, prohibits 
private firms from going after criminals themselves; active defense 
in Thailand is generally considered illegal.  Section 5 of the 
Computer-Related Crime Act, for example, indicates that “any 
person who illegally accesses a computer system for which a specific 
access prevention measure is not intended for their own use shall be 
liable to imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine not 
exceeding ten thousand baht, or both.”121  Section 8 states: 
Any person who illegitimately perpetrates any act by 
electronic means to intercept computer data of other people 
during its transmission in a computer system and that 
computer data is not intended for the public interest or for 
use of general people, shall be subject to imprisonment not 
 
that the government is “unaware of an attack group” with significant operational 
capacities). 
 120  Statistics 2018, THAI. COMPUTER EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM, 
https://www.thaicert.or.th/statistics/statistics-en.html [https://perma.cc/QB3K-
EPJP]. 
 121 Computer-Related Crime Act, No. 2 B.E. 2560 § 5 (2017) (Thai.), translated 
in Thailand’s Computer-related Crime Act 2017, THAI NETIZEN NETWORK (Jan. 25, 2017), 
https://thainetizen.org/docs/cybercrime-act-2017/ [https://perma.cc/5X3Z-
37E7]. 
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exceeding three years, or a fine not exceeding sixty thousand 
baht, or both.122   
Furthermore, Section 25 states that if evidence, including 
computer data or computer traffic data, has been acquired by illegal 
means, such evidence cannot be used in courts of law.123 
Three government officials working in Thai cybersecurity units 
who wish to remain anonymous were interviewed for this case 
study.  All of them confirmed that “hack back” activities are illegal 
in Thailand, yet private firms can install defensive mechanisms such 
as firewalls, IDS, and encryption.  However, under a cyber attack, 
“they are required by law to notify law enforcement agencies.  In 
order to collect evidence of an attack, firms can use honeypots only 
to collect such evidence and a record of activities, and they need to 
turn this evidence in to law enforcement in the case of any 
incident.”124  One of the Thai cybersecurity officials mentioned that 
in the event of an attack, “companies can protect themselves or stop 
the attack, for example, by pulling the plug, but they are not allowed 
to engage any activities that create damage to other networks or 
computer systems.  The defense must not damage any customer 
data.”125  The Computer Crime Act does not allow a private Thai-
based firm to proactively go after hackers.  One police officer in the 
Thai cybercrime unit mentioned that “active defense should be 
discouraged because this action can create collateral damage to the 
 
 122 Id. at § 8. 
 123 Id. at § 25.  Yet, the law in criminal procedure code section 226/1 allows the 
police or law enforcement to obtain evidence through illegal means, and such 
evidence can be used in a court of law.  This section of the criminal procedure code 
is normally applied to physical crime.  In terms of cybercrime, it is unclear whether 
this section can be applied.  “Where it is appearing to in Court that any evidence 
arised duly but derived wrongfully, such evidence shall not be admitted by the 
Court, unless  the admission of such evidence will have more useful effect on giving 
justice than bad effect arisen from an impact on the standard of criminal justice 
work system or basic right of liberty of people.  In consideration of admitting an 
evidence according to the first paragraph, the Court shall consider all circumstance 
of case without thinking of the following factors: (1) Proval Value, importance and 
convincing of evidence; (2) Circumstances and gravity of offence in case; (3) Nature 
and injury being arisen from the acting in bad faith; (4) A person, doing wrongful 
act being a cause of deriving the evidence, is punished or not and how it is.” 
Criminal Procedure Code, B.E. 2477 § 226/1, translated in NATLEX: Database of 
national labour, social security and related human rights legislation, INT’L LAB. ORG., 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/MONOGRAPH/93536/109383/F2035808
79/THA93536%20EngTha.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HNP-GDYQ]. 
 124  Telephone Interview with Senior Official, Thai Electronic Transactions 
Development Agency, in Bangkok, Thai. (Nov. 9, 2018). 
 125 Id. 
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network and other computer systems.”126  One of the senior police 
officers interviewed who specializes in cybercrime investigations 
mentioned that “computer networks involve many jurisdictions and 
active defense can violate other nation’s laws,” a topic returned to 
below. 127   When asked if there was any possibility of having 
regulations for active defense, another Thai government official 
mentioned that “the initiative must come from international 
agreement or regulations from organizations such as the United 
Nations or Interpol, and there is a need to have regulations that 
cover the scope of active defense.”128  If anything, with the Paris Call 
being a case in point, the international community seems to be 
turning away from such a permissive regime save, perhaps, for 
elements within the United States and Singapore as is discussed 
further in Part IV. 
In summary, Thai law allows companies to maintain passive 
defensive mechanisms within their own systems.  The law prohibits 
hacking back or other aggressive active defense measures shown in 
Figure 1 that damages third party computer systems, similar to the 
CFAA approach.  Even though Thai law might be amended if 
international guidelines are introduced concerning active defense, 
this seems unlikely, especially given the Australian and G7 
approaches to proactive cybersecurity outlined below. 
3.4. Australia 
As stated in Australian Cyber Security Center’s 2015 Threat 
Report, the cyber threat faced by Australia is “undeniable, 
unrelenting, and continues to grow.” 129   But unlike China, 
Singapore, or Thailand, Australia has long embraced a more bottom-
up approach to cybersecurity risk management emblematic in its 
receptive stance to the National Institute for Standards and 
 
 126 Telephone Interview with Police Colonel, Royal Thai Police, Cybercrime 
Unit, in Bangkok, Thai. (Nov. 9, 2018). 
 127 See infra Part III(E). 
 128 Telephone Interview, Police Inspector, Royal Thai Police, Cybercrime Unit, 
in Bangkok, Thai. (Nov. 5, 2018). 
 129  AUSTRALIAN CYBER SEC. CTR., ACSC 2015 THREAT REPORT 2 (2015), 
https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-
03/ACSC_Threat_Report_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/7GQY-J6GQ]. 
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Technology Cybersecurity Framework (NIST CSF). 130   To help 
protect its public sector, Australia opened the Cyber Security Centre 
in 2014 and established the Australian Cybercrime Online Reporting 
Network, allowing individuals to report cybercrimes that breach 
Australian law.131 
As for specific provisions of Australian law, the broad Privacy 
Act impacts all companies with revenues of more than $3 million 
annually.132  The Act includes a “data security principle,” which 
requires entities that hold personal information to take “such steps 
as are reasonable in the circumstances to protect the information” and 
to delete information that is no longer relevant for any purpose.133  
Moreover, the Australian Criminal Code prohibits “any 
unauthorized access to data held in a computer.” 134   As of this 
writing, only the Australian military enjoys aggressive active 
defense responsibilities but, like the U.S. case study, there have been 
proposals to change the status quo and free up the private sector to 
protect their own networks.135  It is worthwhile to couch these case 
 
 130  See Scott J. Shackelford, Scott Russell & Jeffrey Haut, Bottoms Up: A 
Comparison of “Voluntary” Cybersecurity Frameworks, 16 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L. J. 217, 252 
(2016), https://blj.ucdavis.edu/archives/vol-16-no-2/bottoms-up.html 
[https://perma.cc/D5AH-YC7F] (“This updated Australian cybersecurity strategy 
is believed to be incorporating elements of the NIST framework . . . [t]his would 
allow private companies to determine the appropriate level of cybersecurity for 
their business needs and risk tolerance.”). 
 131  COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL., AUSTRALIA’S CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY 29 
(2016), https://cybersecuritystrategy.pmc.gov.au/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/NGV2-VQ3M] (last visited Feb. 20, 2018). 
 132 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) Part II, div. 1, § 6D (Austl.). 
 133  Privacy Fact Sheet 17: Australian Privacy Principles, OFFICE OF THE 
AUSTRALIAN INFORMATION COMMISSIONER (Jan. 2014), 
https://www.une.edu.au/about-une/leadership/governance/une-legal-and-
governance/privacy?a=63745 [https://perma.cc/Q6XR-RG8W] (emphasis 
added).  However, Australia also imposes data retention requirements in certain 
circumstances.  See, e.g., Josh Taylor, Mandatory Data Retention Passes Australian 
Parliament, ZDNET (Mar. 26, 2015), http://www.zdnet.com/article/mandatory-
data-retention-passes-australian-parliament/ [https://perma.cc/96L5-9J7W] 
(listing cases in which Australia has imposed data retention requirements). 
 134 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) pt 10.7 s 477.1 (Austl.). 
 135 See Marcus Thompson, The ADF and Cyber Warfare, 200 AUSTRALIAN DEF. 
FORCE J. 43, 43–44 (2016), 
https://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/ADFJ/Documents/issue_200/Thompson_N
ov_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/5U2N-3MD6] (describing a variety of perspectives 
on the ways in which Australia needs to modernize and solidify its cybersecurity 
strategy); Nawaf Bitar, Advanced Cyber Attackers Necessitate an Active Defense, ABC 
TECHNOLOGY & GAMES (Aug. 1, 2014), 
http://www.abc.net.au/technology/articles/2014/08/01/4058780.htm 
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studies in greater context, hence the following section that unpacks 
the G7’s efforts to regulate active defense. 
3.5. G7 
Although a deep dive into each G7 nation is beyond the scope of 
this inquiry and has already been accomplished elsewhere,136 Table 
3 does provide a synopsis of each jurisdiction’s current regulation of 
active defense.  
 
Table 3: Sample of Regulations from G7 Nations Pertaining to Active 
Defense137 
 
[https://perma.cc/9UNC-JT4G] (arguing for Australia to adopt an approach of 
“Active Defense, which looks to actively disrupt attackers when they are 
attempting to attack an organization’s infrastructures, but without crossing the line 
and risking retaliation.”). 
 136 See Craig, Shackelford & Hiller, supra note 11 at 740–743. 
 137 Id. (providing an earlier version of this table).  These data were assembled 
from the following sources: Donna Simmons, Laws of Canada as they Pertain to 
Computer Crime, SANS INST. (2002), https://www.sans.org/reading-
room/whitepapers/legal/laws-canada-pertain-computer-crime-673 
[https://perma.cc/ZU64-YBXL]; Cybercrime and the Criminal Code, CAN. DEP’T 
JUST. (2012), https://www.canada.ca/en/services/policing/police/crime-and-
crime-prevention/cybercrime.html; France, CYBERCRIME LAW, 
http://www.cybercrimelaw.net/France.html [https://perma.cc/88MP-ZJUA]; 
Valéry Marchive, Cyberdefence to Become Cyber-Attack as France Gets Ready to go on 
the Offensive, ZDNET (May 3, 2013), http://www.zdnet.com/cyberdefence-to-
become-cyber-attack-as-france-gets-ready-to-go-on-the-offensive-7000014878/ 
[https://perma.cc/TH4C-3KL3]; Germany, CYBERCRIME LAW, 
http://www.cybercrimelaw.net/Germany.html [https://perma.cc/TRJ5-YEV2]; 
Bettina Weisser, Cyber Crime—The Information Society and Related Crimes (2013), 
http://www.penal.org/spip/IMG/file/RM-8.pdf; Italy, CYBERCRIME LAW, 
http://www.cybercrimelaw.net/Italy.html [https://perma.cc/UP8X-R6Q6]; 
Japan, CYBERCRIME LAW, http://www.cybercrimelaw.net/Japan.html 
[https://perma.cc/7R8Q-F2C2]; Graeme McMillan, Japan Criminalizes Cybercrime: 
Make a Virus, Get Three Years in Jail, TIME (June 17, 2011), 
http://techland.time.com/2011/06/17/japan-criminalizes-cybercrime-make-a-
virus-get-three-years-in-jail/ [https://perma.cc/TS6Y-39MP]; Japanese Cyber 
Security Strategy and related Documents, http://www.space-cyber.jp/cyber/ 
[https://perma.cc/5S62-SHWW]; Ryusuke Masuoka & Tsutomu Ishino, Cyber 
Security in Japan, CIPPS (2012), 
http://www.cipps.org/group/cyber_memo/003_121204.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8CPV-U6KZ]; Takato Natsui, Cybercrimes in Japan: Recent Cases, 
Legislations, Problems and Perspectives, 
http://cyberlaw.la.coocan.jp/Documents/netsafepapers_takatonatsui_japan.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5492-NWY9]; Robert Lipovsky, Aleksandr Matrosov, & Dmitry 
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COUNTRY TITLE OF LAW YEAR OF 
LAW 
RELEVANT LANGUAGE 
Canada • Criminal Code 
of Canada § 
342.1 
• Criminal Code 
of Canada § 
430(1.1) 
• 1985 
• 1985 
• “Every one who, 
fraudulently and 
without colour of 
right, obtains, 
directly or indirectly, 
any computer 
service … is guilty of 
an indictable offense 
…” 
• “Every one commits 
mischief who 
willfully 
a. Destroys or alters 
data; 
b. Renders data 
meaningless, 
useless or 
ineffective; 
c. Obstructs, 
interrupts or 
interferes with the 
lawful use of data; 
or 
d. Obstructs, 
interrupts or 
interferes with any 
person in the lawful 
use of data or 
denies access to 
data to any person 
who is entitled to 
access thereto. 
 
Volkov, Cybercrime in Russia: Trends and Issues, ESET (2011), 
https://www.slideshare.net/matrosov/cybercrime-in-russia-trends-and-issues 
[https://perma.cc/PNE4-JH6A]; David Emm, Cybercrime and the Law: A Review of 
UK Computer Crime Legislation, SEC. LIST (May 29, 2009), 
http://securelist.com/analysis/publications/36253/cybercrime-and-the-law-a-
review-of-uk-computer-crime-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/8GAZ-UNLT]; U.K., 
CYBERCRIME LAW, https://www.cybercrimelaw.net/UK.html 
[https://perma.cc/4XXN-JSKJ].  For more information on the U.K.’s efforts with 
regard to active defense, see Active Cyber Defense, NAT’L CYBER SEC. CTR., 
https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/active-cyber-defence [https://perma.cc/YHJ9-KX58]. 
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France Penal Code Article 
323-1 
2000 (not 
in force 
until 
2002) 
“Fraudulent accessing or 
remaining within all or 
part of an automated 
data processing system 
is punished by a 
sentence not exceeding 
two years’ imprisonment 
and a fine of 30.000 
euro.” 
Germany Penal Code Section 
202(a): Data 
Espionage 
1998 “Any person who 
obtains without 
authorization, for 
himself or for another, 
data which are not 
meant for him and 
which are specially 
protected against 
unauthorized access, 
shall be liable to 
imprisonment for a term 
not exceeding three 
years or to a fine.” 
Italy Penal Code Article 
615 
ter:  Unauthorized 
access into a 
computer or 
telecommunication 
systems 
2008 “Anyone who enters 
unauthorized into a 
computer or 
telecommunication 
system protected by 
security measures, or 
remains in it against the 
expressed or implied 
will of the one who has 
the right to exclude him, 
shall be sentenced to 
imprisonment not 
exceeding three years.”  
Japan Law No. 128, 
Article 3: 
Unauthorized 
Computer Access 
Law 
1999 (In 
effect in 
2000) 
“No person shall 
conduct an act of 
unauthorized computer 
access.”  
United 
Kingdom 
Computer Misuse 
Act 
1990 
(amended 
in 2006—
Police 
and 
“(1)A person is guilty of 
an offence if— 
a. he causes a 
computer to perform 
any function with 
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Justice 
Act, 
Section 
35) 
intent to secure 
access to any 
program or data 
held in any 
computer [,or to 
enable any such 
access to be secured] 
b. the access he intends 
to secure [,or to 
enable to be 
secured,] is 
unauthorised; and 
c. he knows at the time 
when he causes the 
computer to perform 
the function that that 
is the case.” 
United 
States 
• USA Patriot 
Act 
• Computer 
Fraud and 
Abuse Act 
18 U.S.C. 
§ 1030 
(2001) 
 
8 U.S.C. § 
1030 
(1984, last 
updated 
2008) 
• This Amendment to 
the Patriot Act 
pertains to 
“computers outside 
of the United States 
so long as they affect 
‘interstate or foreign 
commerce or 
communication of 
the United States.’138 
• The Computer 
Fraud and Abuse 
Act regulates those 
who “knowingly” or 
“intentionally” 
access “a computer 
without 
authorization or 
exceed[] authorized 
access . . . .”  18 
U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2). 
 
 138  For a thorough review of U.S. cybercrime law as it pertains to active 
defense and “hacking back,” see Prosecuting Computer Crimes, DEP’T JUST., OFF. 
LEGAL EDUC., 3, tbl. 1 (2010), 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/ccmanual.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/474U-LQH7].  
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• The Department of 
Justice has noted 
that “[t]he term 
‘without 
authorization’ is not 
defined by the 
CFAA. The term 
‘exceeds authorized 
access’ means ‘to 
access a computer 
with authorization 
and to use such 
access to obtain or 
alter information in 
the computer that 
the accesser is not 
entitled so to obtain 
or alter.’” 18 U.S.C. § 
1030(e)(6).”139 
 
At least three converging trends are apparent from Table 3, 
among them: (1) the fact that every G7 nation, as well as all 50 U.S. 
states along with Thailand, forbids unauthorized access, 
demonstrating the uphill battle faced by new active defense 
legislation; (2) that these laws are mostly dated at this point given 
the fast pace at which cybersecurity is advancing, as well as being 
rather broad, similar to China and Australia’s approaches (Canada’s 
Criminal Code regulates unauthorized access broadly as 
“[e]veryone [who] commits mischief”140); and (3) that the penalties 
involved vary greatly.  Fines can reach 30,000 euro in France.141  The 
duration of jail time, though, does show more consistency, with the 
exception of the United States, where sentences can exceed 20 years 
 
 139 Id. at 5. 
 140 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, § 430(1.1) (Can.). 
 141 CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] [PENAL CODE] art. 323–1 (Fr.); UGOLOVNIY KODEKS 
ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [UK RF] [Criminal Code] art. 272 (Illegal Accessing of 
Computer Information) (Russ.).  One area of divergence between these nations 
involves the cybersecurity requirements on protected systems before the legal 
regime is activated.  In both Germany and Italy, for example, only networks 
“specially protected against unauthorized access” are covered.  STRAFGESETZBUCH 
[STGB] [PENAL CODE], § 202(a) (Data Espionage), https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html [https://perma.cc/T8YY-YT6D] 
(Ger.); Penal Code art. 615-ter. (Unauthorized access into a computer or 
telecommunication system) (It.). 
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for CFAA violations. 142   Political convergence across the G7, 
facilitated in no small part by the Council of Europe Convention on 
Cybercrime (Budapest Convention), 143  has also helped propel 
common cybersecurity norm building across this group.  For 
example, in 2017 the G7 reiterated a list of non-binding cybersecurity 
norms, which were first identified in the 2015 United Nations Group 
of Governmental Experts report and G20 Leaders’ Communiqué,144 
a topic returned to in Part IV. 
 
 142 Prosecuting Computer Crimes, DEP’T JUST., OFF. LEGAL EDUC. 3, tbl. 1 (2010), 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/ccmanual.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/474U-LQH7]. 
 143 Convention on Cybercrime, Council of Europe, E.T.S. 185 (Nov. 23, 2001), 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/html/185.htm 
[https://perma.cc/84EJ-FSBQ] [hereinafter Cybercrime Convention].  See also Stein 
Schjolberg, The History of Global Harmonization on Cybercrime—The Road to Geneva, 
CYBERCRIME LAW, at 3, (Dec. 2008), 
http://www.cybercrimelaw.net/documents/cybercrime_history.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DKL2-5ZTE] (discussing the history of G8 efforts to mitigate 
cybercrime). 
 144 Group of Seven, G7 Declaration on Responsible States Behavior in Cyberspace, 
at 3–5 (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000246367.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RVU9-YA5V] (“1. Consistent with the purposes of the United 
Nations, including to maintain international peace and security, States should 
cooperate in developing and applying measures to increase stability and security 
in the use of ICTs and to prevent ICT practices that are acknowledged to be harmful 
or that may pose threats to international peace and security; 2. In case of ICT 
incidents, States should consider all relevant information, including the larger 
context of the event, the challenges of attribution in the ICT environment and the 
nature and extent of the consequences; 3. States should not knowingly allow their 
territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts using ICTs; 4. States should 
consider how best to cooperate to exchange information, assist each other, 
prosecute terrorist and criminal use of ICTs and implement other cooperative 
measures to address such threats.  States may need to consider whether new 
measures need to be developed in this respect; 5. States, in ensuring the secure use 
of ICTs, should respect Human Rights Council resolutions 20/8 and 26/13 on the 
promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet, as well as 
General Assembly resolutions 68/167 and 69/166 on the right to privacy in the 
digital age, to guarantee full respect for human rights, including the right to 
freedom of expression; 6. A State should not conduct or knowingly support ICT 
activity contrary to its obligations under international law that intentionally 
damages critical infrastructure or otherwise impairs the use and operation of 
critical infrastructure to provide services to the public; 7. States should take 
appropriate measures to protect their critical infrastructure from ICT threats, taking 
into account General Assembly resolution 58/199 on the creation of a global culture 
of cybersecurity and the protection of critical information infrastructures, and other 
relevant resolutions; 8. States should respond to appropriate requests for assistance 
by another State whose critical infrastructure is subject to malicious ICT acts.  States 
should also respond to appropriate requests to mitigate malicious ICT activity 
aimed at the critical infrastructure of another State emanating from their territory, 
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4. IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGERS AND POLICYMAKERS 
This final part explores some of the myriad implications of 
permitting particularly more aggressive active defense measures as 
a matter of policy, beginning with the underappreciated intersection 
of proactive cybersecurity and cyber risk insurance.  Next, we move 
on to possible reform efforts, before concluding with a wider 
discussion about the place of active defense as part of a push toward 
cyber peace.  
4.1. Cyber Risk Insurance 
Insurance has long been recognized as being an important tool 
in mitigating cyber risk, but is one that is relatively immature and 
“not standardized, likely resulting in coverage gaps and a litigious 
claims environment.”145  After all, insurance is a risk management 
mechanism across sectors ranging from automobiles to floods.  
Realizing the market opportunity, insurance firms have been 
experimenting with cyber risk insurance policies since the early 
 
taking into account due regard for sovereignty; 9. States should take reasonable 
steps to ensure the integrity of the supply chain so that end users can have 
confidence in the security of ICT products.  States should seek to prevent the 
proliferation of malicious ICT tools and techniques and the use of harmful hidden 
functions; 10. States should encourage responsible reporting of ICT vulnerabilities 
and share associated information on available remedies to such vulnerabilities to 
limit and possibly eliminate potential threats to ICTs and ICT-dependent 
infrastructure; 11. States should not conduct or knowingly support activity to harm 
the information systems of the authorized emergency response teams (sometimes 
known as computer emergency response teams or cybersecurity incident response 
teams) of another State.  A State should not use authorized emergency response 
teams to engage in malicious international activity.  12. No country should conduct 
or support ICT-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or 
other confidential business information, with the intent of providing competitive 
advantages to companies or commercial sectors.”). 
 145 W. Jean Kwon, The Insurance Business in Transition to the Physical-Cyber 
Market: Communication, Coordination and Harmonization of Cyber Risk 
Coverages, SSRN WORKING PAPER (June 28, 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3201875. 
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2000s.146  The market might exceed $7.5 billion by 2020,147 a trend 
that is being fueled by new regulatory requirements such as 
Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).148 
Yet, active defense is an arena that is only beginning to be 
considered by insurance professionals.  According to Stephen Vina, 
a senior vice president at Marsh Insurance: 
The cyber insurance market can adjust rather quickly to new 
and evolving threats and cybersecurity techniques, but 
active defense injects a level of legal uncertainty and risk that 
carriers are unlikely to embrace at this time.  However, there 
is a wide range of active defense techniques and carriers will 
undoubtedly work with their clients during the 
underwriting process to ensure they fully understand the 
practices involved, risks posed, and legality of the 
activity.  Should active defense gain firmer legal footing, 
some in the cyber insurance industry may find it 
advantageous to develop creative risk transfer solutions that 
can help provide companies some financial protection as 
they look to better secure their networks with more 
advanced techniques.  Moreover, cybersecurity companies 
may look to the insurance industry to provide coverage for 
 
 146 Jon Swartz, Firms’ Hacking-Related Insurance Costs Soar, USA TODAY (Feb. 9, 
2003), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/computersecurity/2003-02-
09-hacker_x.htm [https://perma.cc/3P6E-38BF]; see also Safeonline Launches Internet 
Security Insurance, HISCOX, 
https://www.cc.gatech.edu/computing/acmnews/msg00349.html. 
 147 See Jim Finkle, Cyber Insurance Premiums Rocket After High-Profile Attacks, 
REUTERS (Oct. 12, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/12/us-
cybersecurity-insurance-insight-idUSKCN0S609M20151012 
[https://perma.cc/HYM6-EXJY]; Nicole Perlroth, Insurance Against Cyber Attacks 
Expected to Boom, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2011), 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/23/insurance-against-cyber-attacks-
expected-to-boom/ [https://perma.cc/5EBR-3LKE]; Robert Lemos, Should SMBs 
Invest in Cyber Risk Insurance?, DARK READING (Sept. 9, 2010), 
https://www.darkreading.com/should-smbs-invest-in-cyber-riskinsurance/d/d-
id/1134322?piddl_msgorder=thrd [https://perma.cc/47SV-RSBL].  
 148 See Carolyn Cohn, Europe’s New Data Privacy Law Boosts Cyber Insurance 
Sales, INS. J. (May 22, 2018), 
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2018/05/22/489977.ht
m [https://perma.cc/XZ2V-E5WU] (“Insurers say the directive, together with 
major cyber attacks like last year’s WannaCry and NotPetya viruses, is driving 
demand in Europe for cyber insurance—a sector seen as relatively profitable.”).  
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potential liability stemming from their active defense 
services.149 
It is likely that, regardless of new federal and state regulations, 
the insurance industry will have an important role in shaping 
corporate proactive cybersecurity policies, especially if a critical 
mass of insurance providers elect not to insure companies that 
engage in hacking back.  That being said, activities that fall more on 
the passive side of the active defense spectrum outlined in Figure 1 
(e.g., intelligence gathering, intrusion reporting, honeypots, etc.) are 
already becoming mainstays of effective cybersecurity risk 
management,150 and as such may be encouraged by insurers. 
4.2. Reform Efforts 
Continuing confusion over the scope and meaning of the CFAA 
specifically, and the permissible bounds of active defense in the 
United States and abroad generally, has led to efforts aimed at 
ensuring greater clarity.  In the United States this stems from 
potential policy reforms through both the executive and legislative 
branches.  For example, a 2016 George Washington University 
report called on the Executive to: 
1. [I]ssue public guidance to the private sector with respect 
to active defense measures that it interprets to be allowable 
under current law, indicating that DOJ would not pursue 
criminal or civil action for such measures assuming that they 
are related to the security of a company’s own information 
and systems.  Such guidance should be updated on a regular 
basis consistent with ongoing developments in technology. 
2. DOJ and the Federal Trade Commission should update 
their “Antitrust Policy Statement on Cybersecurity 
Information Sharing” (2014) to state clearly that antitrust 
 
 149 Interview with Stephen Vina, Senior Vice President, Marsh Insurance, in 
New York, NY (July 10, 2018). 
 150 See, e.g., Mark Dargin, Increase Your Network Security: Deploy a Honeypot, 
NETWORK WORLD (Oct. 24, 2017), 
https://www.networkworld.com/article/3234692/lan-wan/increase-your-
network-security-deploy-a-honeypot.html [https://perma.cc/6FV9-68R7] 
(providing a useful description of the term “honeypot”). 
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laws should not pose a barrier to intra-industry coordination 
on active defense against cyber threats. 
3. The Department of Homeland Security should 
coordinate the development of operational procedures for 
public-private sector coordination on active defense 
measures, utilizing existing mechanisms for cooperation 
such as the industry-led Information Sharing and Analysis 
Centers (ISACs) and Information Sharing and Analysis 
Organizations (ISAOs), and the National Cybersecurity and 
Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) at DHS.151 
The report, which included a number of notable co-chairs 
including the former Secretary of Homeland Security Michael 
Chertoff, also suggested that NIST develop best practices with 
regard to active defense (building from its work on the CSF), that 
federal agencies fund new active defense research and development 
initiatives, that the State Department work with international 
partners on active defense norms development, and that the White 
House work to define what steps federal agencies may take on 
helping the private sector with active defense measures and with 
coordinating this effort.152   Many of these steps, though, will be 
difficult to take under the Trump Administration’s current policies, 
given U.S. disengagement from numerous multilateral fora 
including in the Internet governance space.153 
What can, or should, Congress do to help rethink active defense? 
The George Washington Report suggests that Congress should pass 
legislation to oversee the Executive Branch efforts outlined above, 
but it also calls on Congress to amend the CFAA “to ensure that low- 
and medium-risk active defense measures are not directly 
prohibited in statute.”154  However, what is meant exactly by “low- 
and medium-risk” measures is left undefined in the Report, a 
somewhat curious omission given the well-known difficulties of 
attribution and escalation in this space.  This suggestion, though, 
would seem to include a reformed Graves bill, so long as the 
legislation incorporated appropriate (and mandatory) oversight, 
 
 151 INTO THE GRAY ZONE: THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND ACTIVE DEFENSE AGAINST 
CYBER THREATS, CTR. FOR CYBER & HOMELAND SEC., at xii–xiii (2016), 
https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2371/f/downloads/CCHS-
ActiveDefenseReportFINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/8P8K-QTBT]. 
 152 Id. at xiv. 
 153 See Osnos, supra note 105 (suggesting the U.S.’s disengagement). 
 154 INTO THE GRAY ZONE, supra note 151, at xiii. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss2/3
2019] Rethinking Active Defense 421 
clarified which types of primarily passive active defense such as 
beaconing are permissible under other federal laws besides 
CFAA,155 clarified the scope and key terms used such as what is 
meant by “persistent” breaches and “computer of the attacker,”156 
and was limited to only a narrow subset of the most damaging cyber 
attacks, perhaps those targeting critical infrastructure sectors such 
as the power grid, water, transportation, healthcare, and banking.  A 
pilot program, perhaps building from Singapore’s experience, 
would help in this regard given ongoing concerns over attribution 
and the numerous other objections to aggressive active defense 
discussed above. 
Finally, to establish industry active defense best practices, the 
private sector can, and should, create new fora to coordinate 
responses between stakeholders including Internet and Cloud 
service providers, and leverage corporate governance to wargame 
various scenarios and think through responses.157  The insurance 
industry can be a partner in this undertaking, as can other global 
stakeholders.  For example, Siemens unveiled its “Charter of Trust” 
during the 2017 Munich Security Conference, which listed ten norms 
“to enhance confidence in technology[,] including: “supply-chain 
protection,” “security by default,” and “innovation,” which includes 
deeper public-private partnerships that could include active 
defense. 158   When combined with Microsoft’s push for a Digital 
Geneva Convention, which would aim to, among other things, 
protect critical infrastructure while limiting the development and 
use of cyber weapons,159 there seems to be a growing appetite for 
active private-sector engagement in cybersecurity norm building.  In 
 
 155 See Chris Cook, Hacking Back in Black: Legal and Policy Concerns with the 
Updated Active Cyber Defense Certainty Act, JUST SECURITY (Nov. 20, 2017), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/47141/hacking-black-legal-policy-concerns-
updated-active-cyber-defense-certainty-act/ [https://perma.cc/DJR5-WPUP] 
(noting that the proposed ACDC Act “only amends the CFAA and says nothing 
about the electronic surveillance statutes such as the Wiretap Act, the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, and the Pen Register Trap and Trace statute.”).  
Beaconing is the “the continuous transmission of small packets (beacons) that 
advertise the presence of the base station.” Beaconing, PC MAG. ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
https://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/38503/beaconing 
[https://perma.cc/PZ44-G97J]. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. at xiv. 
 158 Garrett Hinck, Private Sector Cyber-Norm Initiatives: A Summary, LAWFARE 
(June 25, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/private-sector-cyber-norm-
initiatives-summary [https://perma.cc/54QZ-M8V9]. 
 159 Id. 
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fact, in April 2018, thirty-four leading tech firms—including 
Microsoft and Facebook—signed the “Cybersecurity Tech Accord,” 
which calls on signatories to help safeguard “users and customers” 
from cyber attacks, and “oppose attacks on civilians and 
businesses,” which, it seems, includes a prohibition on hacking 
back.160  Such partnerships, including the Paris Call discussed next, 
while not being embraced by all nations as of this writing, are also 
indicative of a shift toward a more polycentric approach at 
enhancing global cybersecurity in what could be considered a push 
for cyber peace. 
4.3. Prospects for a Proactive Cyber Peace 
“Cyber peace” has been defined by the U.N. as “a universal 
order of cyberspace” built on a “wholesome state of tranquility, the 
absence of disorder or disturbance and violence.” 161   However 
desirable, such a cyber end-game is unlikely, at least in the near 
term.162  Cyber peace is defined here, as it has been done in previous 
works, not as the absence of conflict or what may be called negative 
cyber peace.163  Rather, cyber peace is: 
the construction of a network of multilevel regimes that 
promote global, just, and sustainable cybersecurity by 
clarifying the rules of the road for companies and countries 
alike to help reduce the threats of cyber conflict, crime, and 
espionage to levels comparable to other business and 
national security risks.  To achieve this goal, a new approach 
to cybersecurity is needed that seeks out best practices from 
the public and private sectors to build robust, secure 
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systems, and couches cybersecurity within the larger debate 
on Internet governance. 164   
Working together through polycentric partnerships—such as 
those Cybersecurity Tech Accord and Siemens’s Charter of Trust 
discussed above—"we can mitigate the risk of cyber war by laying 
the groundwork for a positive cyber peace that respects human 
rights, spreads Internet access along with best practices, and 
strengthens governance mechanisms by fostering multi-stakeholder 
collaboration.”165  A key aspect of that effort is engaging in dialogue, 
including about key policy differences surrounding cyber 
sovereignty, 166  lest the worrying trend toward Internet 
fragmentation continue unabated.167  
What role can active defense play in such an undertaking?  
Critics abound.  Some commentators, for example, make the case 
that deterrence-by-denial should be at the forefront of cybersecurity 
policy given “[p]roblems of attribution, displays of power, 
controllability and the credibility of digital capabilities.” 168 
According to Professor Patrick Lin: 
It is much too premature to allow for hacking back, even if 
the practice isn’t immoral . . .  At minimum, there needs to 
be a clear process to authorize or post-hoc review cyber 
counterattacks to ensure they’re justified, including penalties 
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for irresponsible attacks.  That oversight infrastructure 
hasn’t even been sketched out.169 
The ACDC Act is an attempt at mitigating Professor Lin’s 
concerns by tapping the FBI to play an oversight role.  But this still 
does not get to the bigger issue.  As was argued in the New Yorker, 
“[s]hould hacking back become legal, it may well help individual 
victims of cybercrime, but it is unlikely to make the Internet a safer 
place.”170  This view is shared by Chris Cook of the U.S. Department 
of Justice, who said “the crucial question policymakers should be 
asking is whether we are comfortable allowing foreign 
actors/private entities to do on our own networks what we are 
proposing to authorize on theirs.” 171   Such a destabilizing 
development would curtail efforts aimed at establishing 
international cybersecurity norms, as James Lewis, among others, 
has argued, potentially leading to “an abandonment of U.S. efforts 
to establish international norms against this type of activity.” 172  
Concerns over friendly fire, and firms being caught in the middle of 
protracted cyber conflicts involving myriad private- and public-
sector stakeholders, did little to convince the Trump 
Administration, for example, to embrace the Paris Call for Trust and 
Stability in Cyberspace.  This agreement is a multi-stakeholder 
statement of principles designed to help guide the international 
community toward greater cyber stability, and perhaps one day 
cyber (also known as digital) peace.  In particular, the agreement 
calls for action to safeguard civilian infrastructure, Internet access, 
and for the international community to “[t]ake steps to prevent non-
State actors, including the private sector, from hacking-back, for 
their own purposes or those of other non-State actors.”173  On the 
day it was announced, more than 50 nations (with the notable 
exception of the United States), “130 companies and 90 universities 
and nongovernmental groups” signed the Paris Call,174 including its 
pledge against allowing for aggressive active defense.  
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This emerging international norm against aggressive active 
defense does not mean, though, that proactive cybersecurity—
especially on the passive side of the active defense spectrum—is not 
essential to building resilience and due diligence across vulnerable 
critical infrastructure sectors.  In fact, such a “lean in” approach to 
cybersecurity is essential to help guard against the more reactive 
mindset that has long bedeviled the field of cybersecurity risk 
management. 175   And more firms seem to be embracing this 
viewpoint, even as there is continued strong resistance from the tech 
community as seen in the Cybersecurity Tech Accord, across the G7, 
and in all 50 U.S. states. According to Vina: 
Legal uncertainties and potential unintended consequences 
currently limit the practicality of active defense, leading to 
more risk than reward at this point in time.  When viewed 
across a comprehensive cybersecurity risk management 
strategy, firms are more inclined to select better established 
cyber defenses with identifiable metrics that meet 
business, contractual, or regulatory requirements.  That said, 
interest in active defense appears to be slowly growing as 
policy makers consider cyber legislation to address more 
sophisticated threats and cybersecurity within the business 
community matures, leaving the door open for this tool to 
grow in importance in the coming years.176 
As the political winds shift, and more firms suffer from cyber 
attacks that governments have so far failed to stop, passive active 
defense may well become more mainstream in more nations.  The 
question is one of institutional clarify, harnessing the benefits while 
minimizing the myriad risks in this practice.177  Already, in 2019 the 
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United States along with twenty-six other nations issued a “Joint 
Statement on Advancing Responsible State Behavior in 
Cyberspace,” which underscored the point that “the international 
rules-based order should guide state behavior in cyberspace.178  Yet 
this Statement also maintained that these nations would “work 
together on a voluntary basis to hold states accountable when they 
act contrary” to the goal of ensuring “a free, open, and secure 
cyberspace for future generations.”179  Clearly, then, “responsible” 
State behavior remains in the eye of the beholder with accountability 
mechanisms polycentric in nature, and still rather nascent.  Such a 
deficit in cybersecurity governance calls out for active engagement. 
5. CONCLUSION 
This Article has tracked the debate surrounding active defense, 
detailing how the policy has evolved at the state and federal level in 
the United States, across the G7, and in other major economics, 
including China, Australia, Thailand, and Singapore.  Across these 
jurisdictions, we see a historic reluctance to embrace the notion of 
aggressive active defense (e.g., hacking back), and instead there has 
been a marked trend toward criminalizing unauthorized access. 
However, the Georgia hack-back bill, the ACDC Act, and 
Singapore’s active defense policies portend policy shifts in the 
making that could destabilize the status quo and impact on 
cybersecurity norm developments.  At a time when many forums 
are being created and repurposed to promote stability, and even 
some measure of cyber peace, if more nations permit active defense 
then this progress, in the form of nascent norms as embodied in the 
Paris Call, could be scuttled.  To avoid this outcome, any policy of 
permitting active defense should be narrowly tailored to only allow 
passive active defense measures under strict government oversight, 
and only then for the worst cyber attacks on civilian critical 
infrastructure sectors.  A better option might be to pursue an 
attribution council that would allow for unbiased, third party 
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investigations of cyber attacks without assignment of liability.180  
Ultimately, we should embrace the best of proactive cybersecurity 
while not letting the quest for cyber peace degenerate into a tit-for-
tat battle of digital vigilantes seeking to protect their networks but 
ultimately exacerbating the very cyber insecurity they are fighting 
to end. 
 
 180 See, e.g., Karl Grindal et al., Institutionalizing Transnational Cyber Attribution: 
A Survey and Research Agenda (Ostrom Workshop Working Paper, 2018), 
https://ostromworkshop.indiana.edu/pdf/seriespapers/2018fall-
colloq/mueller-paper.pdf (providing a proposal of an attribution council). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
